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Introduction
Amendments to the United States Constitution gestate in a curi-
ously ill-understood manner. We know little about constitutional facts
of life even with two hundred years of amending experience, the gui-
dance of Article V, and about' twenty-seven amendments. Despite
the importance of questions about the amending process, there has
been a remarkable reluctance to answer them. Perhaps this is because
the amending process has suffered so long from uncertainty and in-
consistent approaches that any resolution seems to require accepting
the unacceptable. Wariness of throwing out the baby with the bath
water has dampened desires to risk throwing out long-accepted
amendments for the sake of cleaning up and enforcing rules of the
amending process. This prospect looms in three issues: (1) a state's
right to rescind its earlier ratification of an amendment still pending,
(2) the possibility of ratification time limits, and (3) the propriety of
congressional promulgation and declaration of an amendment's suc-
cessful ratification.
First, consider whether a state may rescind its earlier ratification
of a still-pending amendment. If a state may rescind, then Congress
has been acting unconstitutionally by disregarding state rescissions
when it has declared amendments ratified, and well-established histor-
1. Cf. Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 25 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
ical precedent would be a history of serious constitutional error.2 If,
however, a state may not rescind, then an amendment Congress pro-
posed in 1861 to entrench slavery may continue to slouch toward
birth.3 This possibility proves disturbing in light of the lesson of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment: that sporadic ire in state legislatures
can push an amendment toward ratification-even if it takes centu-
ries.4 Moreover, denying states the power to rescind earlier ratifica-
tions may frustrate their constitutional role as barometers of popular
support for a particular fundamental governmental change.5 In short,
the dilemma seems to force a choice between well-established con-
gressional precedent and the denial of states' roles in ensuring that the
Constitution rests upon the consent of the governed.
Next, consider whether pending amendments expire if not rati-
fied within a timely manner. The Supreme Court has held that pend-
ing amendments expire if not ratified within a "reasonable time."6 If
they do expire, then surely the putative Twenty-Seventh Amendment
must be stillborn after a 203-year gestation. Yet, it would be a shame
to disallow James Madison's eminently sensible Amendment. Unsur-
prisingly, the scholarly commentary on this provision against self-deal-
2. Most famously, the Fourteenth Amendment was declared to be validly ratified
despite the fact that the Ohio and New Jersey legislatures sent notices of their attempted
rescissions. Congress continued its practice of ignoring rescission attempts with the Fif-
teenth and Nineteenth Amendments. See generally SAMUEL S. FREEDMAN & PAMELA J.
NAUGHTON, ERA: MAY A STATE CHANGE ITS VOTE? 15-18 (1978).
3. Unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed involuntary servitude after
the Civil War, the Corwin Amendment was intended to avert that war with a compromise
on entrenching slavery. In March 1861, Congress proposed: "No amendment shall be
made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or
interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons
held to labor or service by the laws of said State." H.R. Doc. No. 54-353, at 196 (1861).
4. The TAventy-Seventh Amendment required 202 years to be ratified following its
congressional passage. In 1789, James Madison presented it as the second of 12 amend-
ments, of which the last 10 would become our extant Bill of Rights. The Amendment then
received nearly all the votes it required. Ultimately, however, it failed passage and was all
but forgotten until the congressional "salary grab act" in 1873. In response, the Ohio Sen-
ate passed a resolution purporting to ratify it. Again, the Amendment languished. See
generally Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 497 (1992).
5. See infra Part I.B (examining the role of states in amending Federal Constitution).
6. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1921). The definition of "reasonable time,"
however, has been the subject of controversy as Justices have intimated that 13 years suf-
fices for an amendment to lapse. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 451-54 (1938) (stat-
ing, in dicta, that Congress could legitimately find the challenged amendment to have
lapsed after 13 years); id. at 471-74 (Butler, J., dissenting) (opining that 13 years consti-
tuted an unreasonably long time). Seven years, however, has been held to be a reasonable
time for states to ratify. See Dillon, 256 U.S. at 376.
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ing is divided over its validity.7 If amendments do not expire after
even a very long time, then Article V may be the Constitution's most
antidemocratic provision by allowing for fundamental governmental
change that is not based on a broad, contemporary consensus of the
people.8 In addition to the amendment that would entrench slavery,
at least five other pending amendments would forever haunt this
nation.9
Finally, consider the issue of who should deliver an amendment
that has successfully come to term-who should be responsible for
declaring that an amendment has officially passed into law. If amend-
ments can take centuries to ratify, this suggests the necessity for insti-
tutional record keeping and announcement. Courts and
commentators have stated that this responsibility is committed to
Congress alone.' 0 Article V, however, does not textually commit the
duty of promulgation to Congress' for good reason: the institution
proposing an amendment should not also have the power to declare
its cause to be victorious. Such a result clashes with the Framers' in-
tent that the amending process operate to prevent self-dealing by fed-
eral officials.' 2 Presidents seemingly have always wanted a role in the
amending process,' 3 but Article V does not mention the executive
branch, and for good reason. The role of the executive is best suited
to faithfully executing laws, not judging their validity. If the President
does not have constitutional power to decline to spend allocated
7. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 542-43.
8. Cf. Dillon, 256 U.S. at 375 (stating that a contemporary consensus should support
adopted constitutional provisions).
9. Congress has proposed five additional amendments that have not received the req-
uisite number of ratifications. See RIcHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING
AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MucH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO
CHANGE IT? 301-03 (1993). These amendments involve reapportionment (proposed by
Congress in 1789), titles of nobility (1810), regulation of child labor (1924), gender equality
(1972), and District of Columbia statehood (1978). See id.
10. In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), four Justices reiterated the principle
that questions concerning the amending process constitute a political question best left to
congressional resolution. See id. at 1002-03 & n.2. Similarly, in the academic community,
the "'congressional promulgation' model for the resolution of amendment process disputes
has dominated discussion of Article V." Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitu-
tional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 -ARv. L. REv. 386, 388 n,8 (1983).
11. The Constitution simply states that amendments are valid "when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof." See infra text accompanying note 26 (presenting Article V entirely).
12. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. Ray. 457, 460 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent].
13. See infra Part III.C (discussing efforts by various presidents to participate in
amending process).
funds,'14 that is all the more reason that the executive should not have
discretion to declare the validity of a questionable amendment. As
with the executive branch, Article V makes no mention of the third
coordinate branch, the judiciary. The prospect of five people striking
down the product of congressional and state supermajorities also ap-
pears extremely antidemocratic. Of course, the states are a fourth
possibility. But one can imagine Madison's fears of factional strife
materializing if states perform the record-keeping function, especially
if the amendment is one which galvanizes regional differences.' 5
The metaphorical language of gestation and birth aptly suits the
amendment process, not to reify or anthropomorphize, but because
amendments breathe new life into an aging Constitution. In order to
prepare for the arrival of future amendments, we need to answer
these questions.' 6 Otherwise, divisive partisan politics may continue
to beset us well beyond the period of congressional proposal and state
ratification and an amendment's procedural legitimacy may forever
remain contested. Although the Framers seem not to have antici-
pated these three issues, they certainly did not intend that an amend-
ment's fate ultimately be determined by a simple congressional
majority after an uncertain and tumultuous ratification process.' 7
Therefore, this Article suggests that the three fundamental principles
organizing our republican government-federalism, separation of
powers, and popular sovereignty-provide a coherent, constitutional
approach for resolving the problems of rescission, expiration, and pro-
mulgation of amendments. This Article discusses each of these ques-
14. See Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973).
15. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine regional politics playing a decisive role in the
amending process. Consider Professor Grimes's categorization of amendments by the re-
gional interests they served to further. See generally ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND
TIE AMNDMENs TO THE CONsTITUTION at vii, 26 (1978) (classifying the amendments as
follows: Southern, Northern, Western, Transition, and Urban).
16. See Dellinger, supra note 10, at 387 ("Substantial doubt about whether amend-
ments had properly been adopted would be a matter of serious concern: it would leave us
without an agreed-upon text to serve as the basic reference point from which to assess the
legitimacy of government and its actions.").
17. The Framers thought that they were providing for an "easy, regular and Constitu-
tional way" of ratifying amendments. 1 Tim RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 202-03 (1987) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FAmAND, RECORDS].
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 85 at 524-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Questions of rescission, expiration, and congressional promulgation did not arise
during the Framers' lifetimes. See Letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral to Robert J. Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, reprinted in FREEDMAN &
NAUGHTON, supra note 2, at 40-41 (noting that the issue of rescission of earlier ratification
did not arise until 1868 with the Thirteenth Amendment, even though the issue of ratifica-
tion after rejection arose in 1789 and 1791).
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tions separately. Part I of this Article concerns the issue of rescission,
beginning with an examination of the fundamental principle of popu-
lar sovereignty. The people of this nation have the perpetual right to
alter or abolish the Constitution. In doing so, however, the people
must comply with the legal methods of change mandated by Article V
by acting through their state legislatures in calling for or ratifying an
amendment. States act as barometers of popular support for an
amendment by ensuring that sufficient consensus exists to support a
fundamental governmental change. When participating in the process
of amending the Constitution, states perform a federal function that
essentially makes them a temporary fourth branch of the federal gov-
ernment. In this rearrangement of the usual federal hierarchy, neither
Congress nor any other coordinate branch-as a matter of separation
of powers-may confer or constrain the power of states to act on an
amendment. The Constitution alone governs states' capacities to act.
Ultimately, neither the Constitution nor its inherent principle of pop-
ular sovereignty denies states the ability to reconsider their previous
actions regarding an amendment if doing so will better reflect the will
of its people.
Next, Part II of this Article examines the implication of the prin-
ciple of separation of powers-as opposed to the principle of federal-
ism which normally governs the state/central government
relationship-in the context of the expiration of proposed amend-
ments. Indisputably, one federal branch may not circumscribe the
power textually committed by the Constitution to another coordinate
branch. Absent a limitations period originated and incorporated by
Congress into a proposed amendment, no federal branch may declare
an amendment invalid because the states have been either too slow or
too quick to ratify. This means that at least five unratified, but still
pending amendments, will continue to linger because they were pro-
posed without a time limitation. But these amendments will be pre-
vented from inexorably creeping toward validity if states are given the
power to rescind their earlier ratification.
Lastly, Part III of this Article considers the question of who
should deliver a newborn amendment. The question is discussed in
light of the separation of powers relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the states. No further action-such as an official pro-
mulgation or declaration by Congress or an executive proclamation-
is necessary after the ratification of an amendment by the last of the
requisite three-quarters of the states. Instead, promulgation or proc-
lamation usurps the power of states to determine the outcome and
speed of the process by individually deciding to reject, ratify, or re-
scind. However, this is not to say that states should be the ones to
declare an amendment law, because that would invite regional con-
flict.18 Rather, any doubt about the procedural propriety or suffi-
ciency of a putative amendment should be resolved by the judiciary.
Because substantive challenges to an amendment's content cannot be
heard, the courts would merely umpire the rules of the game. Thus
any defects in the ratification process could be cured.
I. May a State Rescind Its Earlier Ratification of a
Pending Amendment?
A. Sovereignty and Primary Authority in the Amending Process
The people of the United States have the collective right to alter
or abolish the Constitution because the Constitution derives its legiti-
macy from the consent of the governed alone. Accordingly, each gen-
eration of the electorate possesses no less political authority than did
the electorate which ratified the original Constitution. During the
Philadelphia convention, Madison affirmed-as a matter of first prin-
ciple-the prerogative of the people to alter or abolish their govern-
ment: "The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by
resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter con-
stitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of rights, [sic]
that first principles might be resorted to."'19 Article V, which ex-
pressly recognizes the majoritarian right to make amendments to the
Constitution, provides that all amendments be ratified by the states
acting on behalf of their residents.
Although Article V provides for constitutional amendments, it
offers only the barest of guidance on the amendment process. During
the Philadelphia convention, Madison realized that the single sentence
addressing amendments would be insufficient to guide the amending
process.20 Thus, he raised the point "that difficulties might arise as to
the form, the quorum &c. which in Constitutional regulations ought to
be as much as possible be avoided."'" Ultimately, the Framers left
behind enough evidence of their intent for the amendment process to
be launched, but not enough to answer several basic questions about
the ratification process. These questions concern how the amending
18. See supra note 15 (noting Professor Grimes's categorization of amendments).
19. 2 FARRAND, RECoRDs, supra note 17, at 476.
20. Indeed, the whole of Article V comprises a single, albeit long, sentence of fewer
than 150 words. See infra text accompanying note 26 (presenting Article V entirely).
21. 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 17, at 630.
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process should function, rather than whether or when the Constitution
may be amended.
Questions about how the amending process should work must be
answered in faithful accordance with Article V. While the people and
their representatives may act to change or abolish the Constitution,
they must comply with the Constitution even while acting to change
it.22 On this point, Alexander Hamilton was adamant: the power to
amend the Constitution does not include the right to ignore it. In Fed-
eralist No. 78, he wrote: "Until the people have, by some solemn and
authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is bind-
ing upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no pre-
sumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their
representatives in a departure from it prior, to such an act."'' The
process of constitutional change must itself be constitutional. Even
though each individual has inalienable political agency, no one is
above the law as "it is binding" on the people "individually." Indeed,
in changing the Constitution, the people must act collectively because
the right to alter or abolish the Constitution is a majoritarian right.
This majoritarian right must be exercised in the collective mode
that James Wilson called "essential to every system of wise, good, and
efficient government" through the elected representatives of the peo-
ple.24 Indeed, according to the dictates of Article V, the people can-
not by themselves act to amend the Constitution. As with most
determinations directly affecting the federal government, the Consti-
tution avails itself of representative democracy in the amending
process.25
22. But see Bruce A. Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFEC-
TION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 73-
74; Amar, Consent, supra note 12, at 459-60 (arguing that Article V does not deny Ameri-
can electorate power to directly amend Constitution because amending process constraints
operate only to prevent self-dealing by governmental officials). While I disagree with argu-
ments that Article V does not govern the amending process if the people themselves act,
the possibility of direct constitutional amendment has no bearing on whether states may
reverse an earlier vote on an amendment pending ratification. Whatever the constraints
on the people themselves, Article V indisputably constrains the process when the federal
and state officials act to amend.
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
24. James Wilson's Opening Address in Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24,
1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTrruTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 795
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter DEBATE].
25. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-4 (electoral college and election of the presi-
dent); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (original provision for election of senators by state
legislators), amended by U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII, §1; U.S. CONT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (ap-
Note that Article V authorizes four actors to participate in the
process of amending the Constitution: Congress, state legislatures,
constitutional conventions called for purposes of proposing an amend-
ment, and state ratifying conventions.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or,
on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal Suf-
frage in the Senate.26
Article V does not mention the President, executive branch officials,
the Judiciary, state governors, or even citizens themselves.2 7 Of
course, the omitted parties will have great influence in the process, but
they are nonetheless not the designated actors for purposes of Article
V constitutional requisites.'
pointment of "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States").
26. U.S. CONST. art. V.
27. During the Philadelphia convention, George Mason noted his objection to the
omission of the people from a direct role in the amending process:
Article 5th. By this Article Congress only have the Power of proposing Amend-
ments at any future time to this Constitution, & shou'd it prove ever so oppres-
sive, the whole people of America can't make, or even propose Alterations to it; a
Doctrine utterly subversive of the fundamental Principles of Rights & Liberties of
the people.
George Mason, Suggested Revisions of Committee of Style Report, reprinted in SUPPLE-
MENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 270
(James H. Hutson ed., 1987) [hereinafter FARRAND, SUPPLEMENT]. Mason's statement
suggests that the other delegates were both aware that the American electorate would
have to act through representation in amending and that the delegates supported this plan.
28. "In the American experience, however, even though the people have been re-
ferred to as the source of all political power, the creation of a written constitution shifted
the ultimate lawmaking powers from the people, as a whole, and spread it among the vari-
ous branches of government." Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1127 (D. Idaho 1981),
vacated as moot sub nom. NOW v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
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B. The Nature of the Role of States in the Ratification Process
1. States as Barometers of Popular Support for a Specific Proposal
The omission of the American electorate from an express Article
V role does not mean that the Framers failed to include the people in
the amending process. Rather, the Framers' statements indicate that
they brought the amending process as close to the people as practica-
ble by requiring action at the state level. The states serve as barome-
ters of public support for the particular amendment in the ratification
process. That the Framers intended to resort to the people for ap-
proval of constitutional changes is evidenced in Hamilton's assertion,
made during the Philadelphia convention, that "[t]here could be no
danger in giving this power, as the people would finally decide in the
case." 9 Even though the states were the designated actors, the Fram-
ers understood that the will of the people should ultimately decide
questions of amendments.
Even James Wilson-who had favored direct election of senators
by the people instead of by state legislatures-declared that although
the state tallies would be determinative, the amending process under
Article V availed itself of the consent of the people. Specifically, in
the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Wilson stated:
The truth is, and it is a leading principle in this system, that not
the states only, but the people also shall be represented. And if
this is a crime, I confess, the general government is changeable
with it; but I have no idea, that a safe system power, in the gov-
ernment, sufficient to manage the general interest of the United
States, could be drawn from any other source, or rested in any
other authority than that of the people at large, and I consider
this authority as the rock on which this structure will stand.30
Indeed, the Constitution acknowledges from the outset that it derives
its authority from the people themselves. The Preamble declares that
"THE PEOPLE of the United States... establish this Constitution for
the United States of America." 31 That the Constitution specified that
"[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be suffi-
29. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 17, at 558. When Hamilton rose to speak on
this point, the allocation of the power to propose amendments to states alone provided in
the Virginia plan remained the prevailing proposal for amendments. The Virginia plan
stated that "provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union when-
soever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to
be required thereto." 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 17, at 22; see also EDWARD
DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 433 (1964).
30. James Wilson's Opening Address in Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24,
1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 24, at 821; see also 1 id. at 801-02.
31. U.S. CONST. preamble.
cient for the Establishment"32 of the new form of government in no
way disparaged the sovereignty of the collective people or the veracity
of the Preamble. The method of ratifying the Constitution, and the
method of ratifying constitutional amendments, have availed them-
selves of representatives of the people of the several states.
Referring to the Preamble, James Wilson explained to the Penn-
sylvania ratifying convention the role of those whose duty has in-
volved voting on a constitutional issue at the state level:
I think that the force of the introduction to the work, must by
this time have been felt. It is not an unmeaning flourish. The
expressions declare, in a practical manner, the principle of this
constitution. It is ordained and established by the people them-
selves; and we [the members of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Con-
vention] who give our votes for it, are merely the proxies of our
constituents. We sign it as their attorneys, and as to ourselves,
we agree to it as individuals.33
Both the Preamble and Article V articulate a form of government that
derives its authority from the people through the actions of state con-
stitutional conventions or legislatures.' This is the essence of repre-
sentative democracy that underpins the United States.
Although the Framers may have submitted presidential elections
and amendment ratifications directly to the people had the enabling
communicative and transportation technologies existed, 5 states were
ultimately chosen and remain the determinative unit for amendment
32. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
33. James Wilson's Summation and Final Rebuttal in Pennsylvania Ratifying Conven-
tion (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 DEBATE supra note 24, at 837.
34. Madison explained the dual role of the people in the founding of the United States
as having federal and national functions:
[I]t appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and
ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special
purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the
people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the dis-
tinct and independent States to which they respectively belong.
TiH FEDERALiST No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Even
though states are no longer independent sovereignties, the federal organization of the
United States preserves the viability of Madison's explanation for the method of approving
constitutional amendments.
35. Compare Speech of James Wilson in the Philadelphia Ratifying Convention, in 1
DEBATE, supra note 24, at 846 ("[A]II the people of the same society ought to meet in one
place, and communicate freely with each other on the great business of representation."),
with THE FEDERALiST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which
they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats
and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all
to be convened at one time, in one place.").
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ratifications.36 However tempting it may be, we cannot simply ignore
express constitutional constraints, but must formally and solemnly al-
ter the Constitution before any other ratifying denominator suffices.3 7
Otherwise, the Constitution becomes nothing more than persuasive
authority. 8
Article V clearly denotes states as actors to gauge public support
by allowing Congress to specify that special conventions within the
states be called to ratify a proposed amendment.3 9 As stated by Phila-
delphia convention delegate, and later Chief Justice Iredell, in the
North Carolina Ratifying Convention:
Any amendments which either Congress shall propose, or which
shall be proposed by such general convention, are afterwards to
be submitted to the legislatures of the different states,... as
Congress shall think proper .... By referring this business to
the legislatures, expense would be saved; and in general, it may
be presumed, they would speak the genuine sense of the people.
It may, however, on some occasions, be better to consult an im-
mediate delegation for that special purpose. This is therefore
left discretionary.4"
Congress may make this determination to bring the decision closer to
the people and away from entrenched state government politics. 41
Thus, in gauging the level of support for amendments, states must not
be bound to a determination should it happen that a broad base evap-
orates.42 States must be able to rescind their ratifications to effect the
will of its citizens.
36. Cf. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 230,230 (1920) ("It is true that the power to legislate
in the enactment of the laws of a state is derived from the people of the state. But the
power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source in the
Federal Constitution. The act of ratification by the state derives its authority from the
Federal Constitution to which the state and its people have alike assented.").
37. See JOHN R. VILE, CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE CONsTrrU-
TIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 129 (1992).
38. Cf. Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking the Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1228-32
(1995) (critiquing approach to constitutional interpretation that departs from express tex-
tual constraints such as Article V).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
40. 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 177-78 (2d ed. 1881) (statement of James Ire-
dell before North Carolina ratifying convention on July 29, 1788); see also United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931); Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1132 (D. Idaho
1981), vacated as moot sub nom. NOW v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
41. The Twenty-First Amendment illustrates this option, being the only amendment
that was ratified by state conventions rather than state legislatures.
42. See Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1148 ("All of the cases which have considered Article
V have reaffirmed the vision of the founding fathers that the essential democratic value of
2. State Legislatures and Ratifying Conventions Perform a Federal
Function
In performing the amendment ratifying function, state govern-
ments act in a federal capacity.43 Thus, separation of powers concerns
must govern the allocation of the balance of powers between Con-
gress and the ratifying states. Congress may not trump-what is for
ratification process purposes-a coordinate branch. States may not be
denied the power to act by Congress. Neither the Constitution nor its
implicit separation of powers foundation support such a result.
The Constitution reorganizes the usual federal hierarchy to en-
sure that Congress may not lord over state actions under the normally
governing Supremacy Clause.44 In case of amendments to the Federal
Constitution, any power of Congress that holds states to their initial
ratification actions would flout the consent of the governed, that is,
the represented people of rescinding states.45 Remember that it is not
the states acting on the residuum of their sovereign capacities, but in
their federal role of ascertaining the base of census for decisions af-
fecting the central government. Thus, the authority of Congress under
the Supremacy Clause does not apply to what is essentially a tempo-
rary fourth branch of the federal government: states in their ratifying
capacity.46
C. Rescission and the Text of Article V-Three Possibilities
Based upon the provision in Article V that an amendment be-
comes part of the Constitution "when ratified" by three-quarters of
states, numerous commentators have concluded that a state may not
rescind its earlier ratification of a proposed amendment. 47 Nonethe-
less, most commentators acknowledge that this phrase lends itself to
three plausible interpretations. The most popular interpretation has
the will of the people be inextricably linked with the state's action in considering
ratification.").
43. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1922); see also Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.
Supp. 1291, 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
44. In contrast to the usual Article I legislation requirements of origination and pre-
sentment, Article V legislation is extraordinary in the sense that legislation need not origi-
nate in Congress-but also with the states-and presentment is not to the President, but
the state legislatures or special conventions. In this sense, Congress is a coordinate branch
with the states collectively, just as Congress is coequal with the President in the usual mode
of legislating. Thus, states perform a federal function in the ratification process.
45. See Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1148.
46. See infra Part III.A (arguing that Congress cannot have plenary authority over the
amending process if federal self-dealing is to be checked by Article V).
47. See supra text accompanying note 26 (presenting Article V entirely).
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been that while an initial state rejection of an amendment is not con-
clusive, a ratification is both effective and final. Another interpreta-
tion has been that a state's initial action either rejecting or ratifying an
amendment is final and may not be reconsidered. The third possibility
is that neither a state's rejection nor ratification is final until the requi-
site three-quarters of states unequivocally ratify, at which point all
state actions are conclusive.
In contrast to the general agreement on the three interpretive
possibilities, scholars have divided as to the correct approach.48 Fur-
thermore, conflicting approaches have been adopted even within the
existing case law. Finally, strategic considerations have contributed as
much to the dialogue as textual fidelity to the Constitution because
much of the commentary on the subject has been written either by
proponents or opponents of a particular amendment.
1. Initial Rejections Null, Ratifications Conclusive
Understandably, the idea that Article V allows states to recon-
sider earlier rejections, but not earlier amendment ratifications, has
been the most popular in literature discussing the subject.49 In addi-
tion to scholarly approval, this approach has been followed by Con-
gress and executive officials as to amendments that have raised the
issue. Further, this approach has a purported venerable pedigree be-
cause it was adopted when the issue of attempted rescissions and rati-
fications despite earlier rejections first arose with the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment's problematic ratification by five
states perplexed Secretary of State Seward, whose duty it was to cer-
tify amendments upon receiving approval of the requisite three-
48. One theoretical possibility-that states may rescind after ratifying, but not ratify
after an initial rejection-seems not to have any authority in support.
49. See Lynn A. Fishel, Reversals in the Federal Constitutional Amendment Process:
Efficacy of State Ratifications of the Equal Rights Amendment, 49 INr. L.J. 147, 147 (1973)
(noting that this interpretation represents the "conventional assumption"). Apparently,
this argument was first made by Governor Bramlette of Kentucky during the pendency of
the Thirteenth Amendment. Speaking to the Kentucky state legislature, he stated: "'Re-
jection by the present Legislative Assembly only remits the question to the people and the
succeeding Legislature.... Nothing but ratification forecloses the right of action. When
ratified, all power is expended. Until ratified, the right to ratify remains .... ' 1865 Ky.
Acts 1, reprinted in Note, Constitutional Law-Amendment of United States Constitution-
Ratification-Power of Judiciary to Pass upon Validity, 24 MiNN. L. REv. 393, 395 n.12
(1940). The subsequent widespread acceptance of this argument is attributable to Jame-
son's treatise on constitutional law. See id.
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quarters of states.50 Three states, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia, had ratified despite their earlier rejections of the amendment
while Confederate governments were still in charge. Further, two
states, New Jersey and Ohio, had voted to rescind their earlier ratifica-
tions. Seward decided to issue the certificate and appended a list of
ratifying states that included these five. Almost immediately, Con-
gress passed a concurrent resolution that the Amendment be rati-
fied.5  In promulgating the Amendment, the congressional
Republican agenda was more controlling than required by textual fi-
delity to the Constitution: "Congress' action with respect to the four-
teenth amendment [sic] is perhaps the most notable example of a
purely political determination of an amendment controversy."52 De-
spite the politically expedient origin of this approach to ratifications,
its defenders note that Congress and the executive branch have not
deviated from it, but affirmed it in promulgating the Fourteenth, Fif-
teenth, and Nineteenth Amendments.53
Precedent, however, holds none of the stare decisis value in com-
pelling continued application in Congress as it does in the courts be-
cause no session of Congress can bind a future session. Nonetheless,
numerous commentators have harped on this congressional precedent
as authoritative.54 Ultimately, reliance on congressional precedent
"attempts to bind successor Congresses to vote in a certain way on
controverted questions of constitutionality and policy, a thing which,
50. Before Congress designated a legislative branch official in 1818, it used to be a
function of this executive branch official to certify amendments to be ratified. See 1 U.S.C.
§ 106(b) (1984) (instructing Archivist of United States to "cause the amendment to be
published, with his certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been
adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the
Constitution of the United States"); Dellinger, supra note 10, at 400-03. This statute has
not, however, eliminated problems of a baffled unelected official making a critical decision
on ratification that Congress feels constrained to follow. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at
540-41 (noting congressional consternation with Archivist of the United States Don W.
Wilson's decision to certify the Twenty-Seventh Amendment after 202 year gestation).
51. See Proclamations of July 20 & July 28, 1868, 15 Stat. 706, 708.
52. Yvonne B. Burke, Validity of Attempts to Rescind Ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment, 8 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 1, 3 (1976).
53. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & NAUGHTON, supra note 2, at 19 ("Historical precedent,
therefore, overwhelmingly tips the scales in opposition to rescission .... While Congress
need not exhibit rigid consistency, it has nonetheless attempted over the years to assure the
nation of some stability and rational predictability in its decision-making process-if only
to maintain its own credibility. Congressional history, then, can be taken as a reasonably
reliable guide to future action on the legality of rescission .. ").
54. See Burke, supra note 52, at 3; W.F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, 30
YALE L.J. 321 (1921); Leo Kanowitz & Marilyn Klinger, Can a State Rescind Its Equal
Rights Amendment Ratification: Who Decides and How?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1001
(1977); Note, supra note 49, at 395-96.
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on the most familiar and fundamental principles, so obvious as rarely
to be stated, no Congress for the time being can do."'
Even the Supreme Court has countenanced the approach of let-
ting congressional precedent settle ratification controversies. In Cole-
man v. Miller,5 6 the Court issued four separate opinions because no
single point gained a majority. Nonetheless, the decision has come to
stand for the proposition that Congress alone determines when
amendments have validly been ratified.5 7 By default, the Court up-
held the idea that states may ratify after rejecting an amendment, but
may not rescind after ratifying. In short, judicial abdication, partisan
congressional pronouncements, and shaky executive branch certifica-
tions constitute the only guidance on the ratification controversy
available from the federal government.
This dearth of contradictory authority from federal officials has
spurred a return to the ultimate federal authority-the Framer's in-
tent on the subject of ratifications and rescissions. In an influential
work, Professor David Watson argued that the Framers, Madison es-
pecially, asserted that a state may not rescind its ratification of an
amendment. 8 Watson contended that "Madison's expression that the
Constitution requires an adoption in toto and forever shows his opin-
ion was that affirmative action having once been exercised by the leg-
islature, it must stand for all time and could not be affected by any
subsequent legislation. '59 To prove this point Watson, as well as other
more recent authors, have uncritically cited the following passage
from Madison's July 1788 letter to Alexander Hamilton:60
My opinion is, that a reservation of a right to withdraw, if
amendments be not decided on under the form of the Constitu-
55. Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82
Yale L.J. 189, 191 (1972); see also Fishel, supra note 49, at 154.
56. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
57. See Note, supra note 49, at 398 (stating that Coleman v. Miller "decided that the
Court lacked the power to decide those questions [about the amending process] because
they are essentially political and not subject to judicial determination"). Although Cole-
man v. Miller has come to stand for this proposition, the decision itself does not so hold. In
the "opinion of the Court," which secured the votes of Justices Hughes, Stone, and Reed,
the Chief Justice wrote: "Whether [plaintiffs] contention presents a justiciable contro-
versy, or a question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question
upon which the Court is equally divided and therefore the Court expresses no opinion
upon that point." Coleman, 307 U.S. at 447.
58. See 2 DAVID K. WATSON, Tim CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS His-
TORY, APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1314-17 (1910). Watson's argument has been
uncritically accepted and relied upon. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & NAUGHTON, supra note 2, at
40; Kanowitz & Klinger, supra note 54, at 1002.
59. WATSON, supra note 58, at 1317.
60. See, e.g., Kanowitz & Klinger, supra note 54, at 1002.
tion within a certain time is a conditional ratification; that it
does not make New York a member of the Union, and conse-
quently that she could not be received on that plan. Compacts
must be reciprocal-this principle would not in such a case be
preserved. The Constitution requires an adoption in toto and
forever. It has been so adopted by the other States. An adop-
tion for a limited time would be as defective as an adoption of
some of the articles only. In short, any condition what ever must
vitiate the ratification.61
Reliance on this quote, however, to support the power of states to
rescind their ratifications of pending amendments to an extant Consti-
tution is misplaced. Madison asserted that any attempt by a state to
enter the union on a conditional basis must fail because becoming part
of our federal republic, which is not a mere league of states bound by
international treaty, compels states to surrender their sovereignty.62
However, Madison did not assert, as Watson contends, that states are
bound by their ratifications of proposed amendments once the Consti-
tution has unequivocally been adopted. Moreover, Madison certainly
did not universally deny the power of states to ever reverse them-
selves on actions upon the federal government. At most, we can de-
rive a rule that a state cannot conditionally ratify an amendment to
the Constitution.63 Even this, however, does not necessarily follow
from the express terms of Madison's letter.
More credible efforts to affirm the power of the states only to
ratify amendments have relied upon the word choice employed in Ar-
ticle V, which states that amendments "shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legisla-
tures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof. . . ."64 Noting that Article V affirms the power of
states to ratify, but does not mention rescission or rejection, support-
61. Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (July 1788), reprinted in 2
WATSON, supra note 58, at 1317.
62. See Amar, Consent, supra note 12, at 465 ("The Articles of Confederation were
nothing more than a tight treaty among thirteen otherwise independent states-a self-de-
scribed 'firm league of friendship' in which each state expressly 'retains its sovereignty."').
Contrast the "treaty" nature of the United States under the Articles with the union of a
United States under the Constitution.
63. An example of an impermissible condition would be if a state conditioned its ratifi-
cation on congressional approval of increased highway funds for that state within the next
two fiscal years. Such contingent or strings-attached ratification of amendments was re-
jected, albeit in dicta, by the court in Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1154 (D. Idaho
1981), vacated as moot sub nom. NOW v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
Whether a state's imposition of a time deadline in its ratification of an amendment
would similarly be impermissible is considered below. See infra Part II.C.2.
64. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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ers of this argument point to congressional treatment of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which followed "the plain meaning" of the
Constitution.65 This has been characterized as "positive power" to
ratify.66 In Coleman v. Miller, the Kansas Supreme Court declared
that the Constitution grants only a positive power to ratify.67 The
United States Supreme Court's ultimate disposition of the case, in ef-
fect, left the Kansas high court's decision standing.6 8
Only rarely, however, do governing bodies possess only a positive
power to act on pending legislation; a negative vote being inconse-
quential. Indeed, the sole example that commentators have proffered
involves the action of a municipality in either approving or rejecting a
bond measure.69 Yet, while the municipal bond situation strays from
65. See Fishel, supra note 49, at 149 n.10 (collecting authority).
66. This argument holds that a state's ratification exhausts its power with respect to
the amendment ratified. See LESTER B. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CON-
sTrruTION 71 (1942); Kanowitz & Klinger, supra note 54, at 1005; Daniel Norman Stevens,
Comment, Constitutional Law-Ratification of Proposed Federal Amendment After Prior
Rejection, 11 S. CAL. L. REV. 472 (1938). Surprisingly, Professor Dellinger may also sup-
port this position on grounds of efficiency and certainty.
67. 71 P.2d 518 (Kan. 1937), affd 307 U.S. 433 (1938).
68. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition of the Coleman case seems to have
confounded the Justices who wrote it as much as those who have had to read and make
sense of it. For example, Sam J. Ervin, Jr. has pointed out that "Chief Justice Hughes did
not reveal the mystery of how nine or five Justices could be 'equally divided' on a constitu-
tional question." 2 FREEDMAN & NAUGHTON, supra note 2, at 86 (recounting statement of
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.). One commentator has noted that the decision was delayed for
several months because "[a]t that time the Court had only eight members, no successor to
Mr. Justice Cardozo having been appointed, and it was believed that they were equally
divided on the question of jurisdiction." Noel T. Dowling, Clarifying the Amending Pro-
cess, 1 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 215,215 (1940). But this still leaves the mystery of how Chief
Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court with only Justices Stone and Reed
concurring.
69. The purported exception involves municipal corporations. See Stevens, supra note
66, at 472 n.5 (quoting COOLEY, CONsTrruTnONAL LAW 257 (4th ed. 1931)).
Where by statute a municipality is permitted, with the consent of the majority of
its electors, to raise exceptional taxes or assume exceptional burdens, an election
once held which results in a favorable vote is conclusive. If, however, the first
election results in a majority against the proposal, and there is nothing in the law
which negatives the right to vote again, the case stands as if no election had been
had, and the sense of the people may be taken again and again, and a favorable
vote at the last election is as effectual as if it had been obtained at first.
Id. Although this is an exception to the general rule that a governing body may not reverse
its action on an earlier determination, the example is nonetheless inapposite here. A rati-
fying state casts but one "vote" on pending Article V-type legislation. It is indisputable
that a representative-here a state rather than just an individual representative-may
change its vote before the final tally. See CONSTrruTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED
THuRD CONGRESS § 511, at 256 (U.S. Gov. Printing Office 1993) (noting authority, in Jeffer-
son's Manual, providing that member may change his vote); id. § 766, at 537 (providing, in
the rule that a governing body may always reverse an earlier action,
this example is inapposite to state ratifications in the amending pro-
cess. A state in the amending process constitutes one of the requisite
votes on pending legislation-amendments being legislation, albeit
not the usual Article I type. Just as a voting member of a municipality
may reverse his or her vote before a requisite majority adopts the
measure, so too may states reverse their votes prior to final ratifica-
tion by three-quarters of the states.
As plausible as this prima facie interpretation of the literal lan-
guage of Article V appears, it requires disregarding the history and
role of states in the constitutional scheme and tends to make the
whole process less deliberate and efficient.70 The amending process
becomes less deliberate because citizens in states that have already
ratified no longer possess the power to act on that amendment-they
become politically estopped. For fear of losing a participatory role in
the amending process on a particular topic, citizens of the several
states would be wiser to wait, in an excess of caution, than to ratify, in
an excess of haste. The impetus would be to slow the amending
process.
2. Initial State Action Final-Whether Rejection or Ratification
Even more so than the first construction of Article V's "when
ratified" requisite, the second possibility-that a state's initial action
in the amending process, whether rejection or ratification, is final-
would curtail political dialogue and the efficiency of the ratification
process. As a result, states would need to exercise extreme caution
when acting on a pending amendment because whatever the decision
adopted-yea or nay-would forever bind the people of that state.
This construction of Article V raises the possibility that once consid-
ered in the state legislature, or special convention, a failure to ratify
the amendment would be tantamount to a rejection of the proposal.
Thus, bodies convened for purposes of ratifying an amendment may
be delayed in order to gauge the response of other states or may alter-
natively remain in session under the fiction that the legislative day has
no relation to the Julian day. In either case, constraining the people of
a state to forever abide with the initial determination of either the
House Manual, that "[b]efore the result of a vote has been finally and conclusively pro-
nounced by the Chair, but not thereafter, a Member may change his vote, and a Member
who has answered "present" may change it to "yea" or "nay") (citations omitted).
70. Cf. ORiELD, supra note 66, at 71.
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state legislature or the special convention cannot make for "an easy,
regular and constitutional amending process.'
Nonetheless, this second possible construction of the power of
states to ratify the Constitution avails itself of greater logical consis-
tency and fairness to the proposed amendment's opponents than the
first construction, which denies all but the positive power to ratify.
Professor Orfield, in an excellent treatise on constitutional construc-
tion, noted that "treating both acceptance and rejection as conclusive
is logically consistent and insures protection of minority rights. '72
Treating rejection, or acceptance and rejection, as binding in the first
instance prevents the weighting of the amending process in favor of
proponents of the pending amendment. If ratifications count but re-
jections do not, then those who favor the pending amendment may try
ad infinitum to secure ratification. Nothing would prevent proponents
from continued lobbying in favor of ratification; at which point they
could rest secure with the knowledge that even if a majority comes to
oppose the amendment, that ratification cannot be reversed. But, op-
ponents of a pending amendment-though they constitute the plural-
ity with respect to proponents and the undecided-would need to
continue their efforts so long as the amendment pends. Even if the
state legislature or special convention rejected the amendment several
times, opponents of the measure could not avail themselves of the
same finality benefiting the proponents. In short, treating the initial
state determination as conclusive prevents the amending process from
becoming a one-way ratchet providing unfair advantage to proponents
of amendments.
Further support for the finality of the initial state action in con-
sidering whether to ratify pending amendments has been found in
construing Article V to provide states only the very limited power to
consider a pending amendment.73 Supreme Court precedent in sup-
port of this position can be found in the curious case of Chandler v.
Wise,7 4 which reached a different result than its companion case Cole-
man v. Miller.7' The Supreme Court's result in Chandler, however,
offers very weak support for the position that the initial state action
71. See FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 17, at 203 (recounting statement of Col.
Mason).
72. ORFIELD, supra note 66, at 70-72; accord Stevens, supra note 66, at 472.
73. See Cadawalder, Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 60 AM. U. L. RE,. 389,
393 (1926); Frank W. Grinnell, A "Point of Order" on the Child Control Amendment, 20
A.B.A. 3. 448 (1934).
74. 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
75. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
on a pending amendment is conclusive. By vacating the case as moot,
the Court let stand the decision of the Kansas high court, which held
that the initial state rejection of the child labor amendment was con-
clusive.76 More than an implicit affirmation of the holding of the
lower court, the Supreme Court reached its result because a majority
believed that the Court's abstention was mandated by the political na-
ture of the controversy. One commentator, writing shortly after Cole-
man and Chandler were handed down, noted the Court's difficulties
with the amending process: "Illustrative of the uncertainty surround-
ing the question as to whether or not a legislature may change its ac-
tion with respect to a proposed federal amendment.., are two recent
decisions arriving at contrary conclusions. '77 Accordingly, as numer-
ous scholars have noted, the Court's apparent support of the lower
court's adoption of this second possible construction of Article V's
"when ratified" phrasing in Chandler constitutes a default of thought-
fulness with respect to the amending process that has yet to be
overcome.
78
A thoughtful analysis of Article V's provision that an amendment
becomes valid "when ratified" by three-quarters of states must com-
port with the accountability to the people that the Framers clearly in-
tended for the ratification process. Imagine that within each of the
thirteen smallest states-which would constitute more than a quarter
of the fifty extant states-a thin majority opposes an amendment and
prevails to quickly reject this proposed amendment. If initial actions
on ratified amendments are conclusive, then these small state majori-
ties, comprising only X% of the total population of the United States,
can prevent the remaining 100-X% of Americans from even consider-
ing that proposal.79 The door would be shut to meaningful political
dialogue that the Framers considered essential for proper considera-
tion of issues directly affecting the federal government. Moreover, no
opportunity for correction of potentially incorrect assumptions or
changing initial opinions of the people would be possible. One can
imagine that opponents of an amendment would quickly flock to the
76. See Burke, supra note 52, at 3.
77. Stevens, supra note 66, at 472.
78. See Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years
Too Late?, 62 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 501,519-20 (1994); see also Note, supra note 49, at 404.
79. The combined population of the smallest 13 states is roughly 11 million, compared
to the 260 million total population of the United States as a whole. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995,
at 28-29. Thus, about six million Americans-constituting a majority in each of the small-
est 13 states--can theoretically prevent ratification of an amendment according to Article
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thirteen smallest states-much as presidential hopefuls flock to New
Hampshire early in the election process-in an attempt to secure their
agenda by early lobbying of a tiny fraction of the nation's population.
Such a focus would be the antithesis of the sort of discussion and
broad support that a proposed amendment should receive under Arti-
cle V.
3. "When Ratified" as Referring to Requisite States in Agreement
The approach that provides for the greatest amount of dialogue
and political agency is one that allows for reconsideration of both re-
jections and ratifications of pending amendments. Yet, this approach
has been rejected exactly on these grounds by numerous commenta-
tors who have feared its impracticality insofar as it would create an
administrative nightmare in keeping track of which states have un-
equivocally ratified. Essentially, this line of objections assumes that
convenience and efficiency inhere in the democratic process of our
constitutional government, especially in the process of amending the
Constitution according to Article V. This third approach has also
been dismissed as a "lottery theory,"8 for which there is "little sup-
port."'" The image of a lottery is intended to conjure an image that
the outcome depends on the final draw of state ratifications and rejec-
tions. Underlying this objection is an assumption that vagaries of cha-
otic state actions in ratifying and reversing will essentially make the
outcome of the amending process a gamble. A final series of objec-
tions to this third approach to rejections and rescissions involves the
contention that proponents of an amendment will be unable to formu-
late a coherent strategy for securing passage if every state's assent re-
mains subject to change.82 Each of these objections ultimately
incorporate an assumption that runs contrary to the premises underly-
ing representative democratic action. As Professor Orfield has noted,
Article V should democratically change a democracy:
80. Fishel, supra note 49, at 149.
81. Burke, supra note 52, at 3. But see, e.g., FREEDMAN & NAUGHTON, supra note 2,
at 100-01 (statement of Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.); Justin Miller, Amendment of the
Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made More Difficult?, 10 MN. L. REv. 185, 188 (1926);
Lester B. Orfield, The Federal Amending Power, 25 ILL. L. REv. 418, 419 (1930); Note,
Constitutional Law-Amendments-Power of a State to Ratify an Amendment After Previ-
ously Rejecting It, 22 MNiN. L. REv. 269, 270 (1938).
82. See Kanowitz & Klinger, supra note 54, at 1003 ("Recognition of a power of the
states to rescind their ratifications would ... create an enormous potential for tactical
abuse."). These commentators, however, fail to elaborate on exactly what the abuse would
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It is more democratic to allow the reversal of prior action. A
truer picture of public opinion at the final date of ratification is
obtained. No great confusion is likely to result from such a rule.
Not to allow reversal of an acceptance may cause a cautious leg-
islature not to act.8 3
This observation has been objected to: "Orfield does not seem to
comprehend the practical difficulties this proposed procedure would
entail."'  Efficiency and convenience, however, are not hallmarks of
democratic government, but of tyranny. The Framers did not premise
the allocation of governmental powers among coordinate federal
branches, between the House of Representatives and the Senate, and
between states and the central government on efficiency in govern-
ment or simplicity for legislating. Instead, the process of democracy
can be frustrating, time consuming, and downright inefficient.
This does not mean that the Framers intended to make passing
laws as hard as possible, but that laws should not be passed without
taking a hard look at them. The process is quintessentially delibera-
tive, depending on consensus and compromise within and among gov-
erning branches. Article V represents the Framers' intention to
provide for channels of deliberation that balance the need for deliber-
ation with the need for efficiency. One of the most important features
of Article V is that it allows only one version of an amendment to
circulate so that the "question can be put forth singly." 5 The deliber-
ation is to be focused on a single issue, stated in the text of a single
proposal so that the existence of several competing versions, each only
slightly different, does not confuse the ratification process. That polit-
83. See ORFiELD, supra note 66, at 72; see also Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107,
1149 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated as moot sub nom. NOW v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
("This objection has little merit when it is realized that all Congress or its designate must
do is count the state's most recent official certification to determine whether or not three-
fourths have ratified.").
84. Fishel, supra note 49, at 149 n.11. Fishel does not elaborate on the "nightmares"
she envisions. Similarly, Dellinger rejects this possibility as giving rise to too much uncer-
tainty in the process. As one commentator has noted, Professor Dellinger's position on
this issue yields an internally inconsistent approach to Article V. See VILE, supra note 37,
at 47.
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (anticipating that "every amendment to the Constitution ... would be a single prop-
osition, and might be brought forth singly"). Professor Michael Paulsen, however, has
noted that Congress could propose two amendments on the same subject, but reaching
opposite results so that states could determine the result by ratifying the one that secures
sufficiently broad support. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE LJ. 677, 700 (1993).
Professor Paulsen's hypothetical is possible, albeit unlikely. Ultimately, the two conflicting
amendments would still address the same issue singly, if by use of two amendments, rather
than an up or down vote on a single amendment.
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ical dialogue-the heart of democracy-makes the legislative process
less efficient is an unacceptable justification for curtailing discussion.
Similarly, curtailing political dialogue to allow for greater cer-
tainty by estopping states that have already assented to a particular
proposal disenfranchises those states' citizens and representatives
from continued political agency. It would constitute the only excep-
tion to the rule that a state legislature has no power to bind a future
legislature of that state. The possibility arises that entire generations
of state citizens will be unable to have a say on a pending amendment
by virtue of living in a state that has once ratified, if amendments do
not naturally expire or expire only after a long period of time. Such
political disenfranchisement cannot be justified by conferring propo-
nents of a particular proposal the luxury of taking ratified states for
granted. Whatever semblance of certainty that state estoppel on the
issue of ratification confers on Article V is unimportant and does not
amount to constitutional legitimacy. Legitimacy for amendments
means that they unquestionably enjoy the consent of the governed by
having comported with the dictates of the rules of recognition pro-
vided in the Constitution. Although a rash of last-minute reversals
might attend the ratification or rejection of an amendment, this repre-
sents democracy in action rather than a lottery. Whereas a lottery
depends on chance for its result, an amendment should depend on a
consensus of acceptance by the American electorate. No great confu-
sion is likely to be generated, despite assertions to the contrary.8 6 Ul-
timately, we must distinguish between uncertainty about the process
and uncertainty existing within a well-understood, accepted process.
The latter is of no constitutional concern and cannot really be credible
in these days of efficient communicative technologies.
Imagine that a state may not rescind its earlier ratification. Then,
as a number of commentators note, some legislatures may be overly
cautious in ratifying, playing a wait-and-see game that delays address-
ing the substantive issue of the proposal. This well-advised caution
when coupled with Congress' practice of setting a ratification time
limit 7 suggests that Congress may be able to exert undue influence
86. See O ELD, supra note 66, at 72; see also Josephine H. Klein, Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Federal Amendments-Finality of States' Action-Time Limit, 18 B.U. L.
REv. 169 (1938). But see FREEDMAN & NAuGi-rrON, supra note 2, at 18 (citing example of
Nineteenth Amendment's ratification when several states vied to "gain the distinction of
becoming the thirty-eighth state to ratify," causing "administrative confusion").
87. Remember that Coleman v. Miller, the Supreme Court's last pronouncement on
the matter, ceded Congress with plenary power to decide this "political question." Neither
the courts, according to Coleman, 307 U.S. 433 (1938), or the president, according to Hol-
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over the states. It is doubtful that the Framers intended to cede to
Congress such unchecked authority in the process. When Hamilton
suggested to the delegates of the Philadelphia convention that Con-
gress should be allowed to propose amendments-that branch not be-
ing included in the amending process under the prevailing plan80-he
reassured delegates that Congress would not be able to dominate the
process. In his reasoning, Hamilton reaffirmed that the amending
process must ultimately account to the people themselves and that
Congress' role is to be helpful rather than hegemonic:
The National Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be
the most sensible to the necessity of amendments, and ought
also to be empowered, whenever two thirds of each branch
should concur to call a Convention- There could be no danger
in giving this power, as the people would finally decide in the
case.
89
Congress cannot control the ratification process because when pro-
posing an amendment, the states have final authority over the ratifica-
tion process. To allow a different result would be to invite the abuses
of federal self-dealing that the constraints in Article V were intended
to guard against. 90 Consistent with the intent for Article V to secure a
critical mass of concurrence for fundamental governmental change
and to prevent federal self-dealing, Congress has no role in the
amendment process once it either proposes an amendment to the
states or convenes a convention for purposes of originating an amend-
ment to be sent to the states.91
According to Article V, an amendment becomes "valid to all In-
tents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof ... ."I For the constitutional amending pro-
cess to rest on the consent of the governed and resist self-dealing by
federal officials, an amendment becomes valid only when ratified un-
equivocally by three-quarters of the states. If a last-minute rescission
prevents a particular amendment from being validly ratified, neither
lingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), have any prerogative to check the deter-
minations of Congress.
88. See generally DUMBAULD, supra note 29, at 433-34.
89. See 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 17, at 558.
90. See Amar, Consent, supra note 12, at 460 (arguing that high hurdles placed in
amendment process were intended to prevent self-dealing by federal officials).
91. In originating an amendment, Congress also has the power to specify whether the
amendment should be ratified by legislature of the states or by special conventions con-
vened in the states. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
92. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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Congress nor any other institution may nudge it along. On the other
hand, if the tally is close, there need be no doubt about states that
ratify after an earlier rejection. This approach, though it would allow
for more play at the joints, would not undermine the legitimacy of the
process or of an amendment passed in conformance with it. What un-
dermines the legitimacy of the amending process at present is the un-
certainty about exactly what the rules are.
This uncertainty has already delayed the acknowledgment of sev-
eral amendments well beyond their constitutional validity. These
amendments-including the Twelfth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments-received the requisite number of ratifications, but
with at least one state attempting to rescind, languished in legitimacy
limbo until an equal number of states as those rescinding had unequiv-
ocally ratified.93 This represents an impermissible encroachment of
the central government on the prerogative of states to alter the Con-
stitution with a three-quarters concurrence. 94
During the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment, New Hamp-
shire's governor vetoed the state legislature's ratifying resolution.95 A
valid New Hampshire ratification would have been the last state nec-
essary for a three-fourths majority. "Rather than proclaim the
amendment part of the Constitution, the national government waited
until another state ratified thus obviating the need for a resolution of
the question. ' 96 All three branches of the federal government con-
tributed to the delay in recognizing the valid ratification of the Fif-
teenth Amendment. The Secretary of State-an executive branch
official whose duty it was to certify an amendment once it received
three-quarters of the states' ratifications-received notice that Ohio
had ratified after an earlier rejection and New York had rescinded its
earlier ratification.97 Ultimately, the Secretary delayed certification
until enough additional states ratified to cover the problematic ratifi-
cations. 98 Congress decided to look into the issue, but never formu-
lated an answer beyond convening committees.99  With the
Nineteenth Amendment, the third branch of government dodged the
93. Cf. Idaho v. Freeman, 527 F. Supp. 1105, 1149 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated as moot
sub nom. NOW v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
94. See Ti FEDEPALIsT No. 84, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
95. See generally MYERS, THE PROCESS OF CONSTIUToNAL AMENDMENT, S. Doc.
No. 76-314, at 34 (1940).
96. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1149.
97. See id. at 1144.
98. See id. at 1149.
99. See id.
issues of rescission and ratification. Finding nothing wrong with the
delay of federal officials in recognizing the amendment's validity until
enough extra states had ratified to cure problematic ratifications, the
Court, in Leser v. Garnett,100 stated:
The remaining contention is that the ratifying resolutions of
Tennessee and of West Virginia are inoperative, because
adopted in violation of the rules of legislative procedure prevail-
ing in the respective states. The question raised may have been
rendered immaterial by the fact that since the proclamation the
legislatures of two other States-Connecticut and Vermont-
have adopted resolutions of ratification. 10
This is an unacceptable way to operate the Constitution because
it imposes an even higher requisite number of ratifications than called
for by Article V. Arguably the Constitution is already too difficult to
amend without extra hurdles being imposed.'02 But most perni-
ciously, it invites constitutional disaster in the form of a future amend-
ment that will not have the same margin of safety as these
amendments have received.
II. Does a Pending Amendment Expire Due to Neglect?
Uncertainty about whether amendments expire for failure to se-
cure the requisite number of ratifications within a reasonable time fur-
ther compounds the confusion of the amending process. To remove
the uncertainty currently clouding the ratification process seems to re-
quire either declaring the Twenty-Seventh Amendment's two-century
ratification period unconstitutional or accepting the possibility that
pending amendments will forever creep toward ratification. This lat-
ter possibility appears especially unattractive in light of the amend-
ment that Congress proposed in order to perpetually entrench slavery.
An additional obstacle to the resolution of this issue is the Supreme
Court's conflicting case law on the issue of timeliness. In Dillon v.
Gloss, °3 the Court found, implicit within Article V, that an amend-
ment must be ratified within a "reasonable time" so that fundamental
governmental change secure a "contemporary consensus," that is, the
100. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
101. Id. at 137.
102. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in REsPoND-
ING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACtiCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT,
supra note 1, at 237, 257, 265 (concluding that "the U.S. Constitution is unusually, and
probably excessively, difficult to amend" especially with respect to the second method of
amendment).
103. 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
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consent of the governed. But in Coleman v. Miller,"° a deeply di-
vided Court abdicated its earlier role in deciding whether a certain
time exceeded the reasonableness requirement to cede plenary au-
thority to make timeliness determinations to Congress. One reason
given by the Coleman Court was that the amending process is "'polit-
ical' in its entirety," from beginning to end. 0 5 Thus, there seems to
exist a timeliness requirement, but no means for determining its
boundaries: the Court will not (because of the political nature of the
question) and Congress cannot (due to the inability to bind a future
session).
Indeed, the Court's characterization of the amending process as
political in the nature of the political legislative branch proved pre-
scient. Congress confronted the issue in the stark terms of the two-
century ratification of Madison's congressional pay-raise amendment
in a most political way. With the next election looming, congressional
representatives were not in a mood to embrace the inevitable political
fallout of declaring a popular congressional check invalid-even if the
precedent for doing so appeared ominous. Thus, the congressional
precedent "holds" that amendments do not expire during the ratifica-
tion process.
Coupled with the denial of state rescission power, congressional
precedent on the amending process renders Article V the most an-
tidemocratic and countermajoritarian provision of the United States
Constitution. Once an amendment is proposed to the states, citizens
will become disenfranchised of their political agency as their states
ratify-however sporadically and slowly-until the vast majority of
the American electorate of almost three-quarters of the states are
powerless to act on the pending amendment. At the point that the
amendment receives the requisite three-quarters ratification, the en-
tire nation will be bound by the new amendment valid to all intents
and purposes because of the one-way ratcheting effect of the Article
V process.
A. The Case for Eventual Expiration of Pending Amendments
This one-way ratcheting effect of Congress's denial of state rescis-
sion power called for some way to keep Article V from being pro-
foundly antidemocratic as pending amendments slouched toward
birth. Noted constitutional scholar Judge Jameson answered this call
by injecting a new element of responsiveness to the people into the
104. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
105. Id. at 459 (Black, J., concurring).
amending process that Congress had made less responsive in disallow-
ing rescissions. Jameson's solution to the one-way ratcheting effect of
denied rescissions recognized that the amending process should com-
mand a sufficient consensus of support by the people themselves for a
proposed constitutional change.106 He formulated this element of re-
sponsiveness to require that ratification occur within a reasonably
contemporaneous time period. Jameson argued:
[A]n alteration of the Constitution proposed to-day has relation
to the sentiment and the felt needs of to-day, and that, if not
ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to ex-
ist, it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted
upon, unless a second time proposed by Congress. 07
The contemporary consensus requirement, while not an express ele-
ment of the Article V amending process, seemed to be implied by the
Framers' declarations that amendments should reflect the will of the
people.'08
Jameson's proposal solved the problem of amendments that had
been proposed by Congress, had failed to secure ratification even af-
ter a lengthy period, and had then become irrelevant due to changed
circumstances. When Jameson issued his treatise, twenty-six years
had elapsed since Congress proposed the Corwin Amendment in
hopes of averting violence over the issue of slavery. 0 9 To say the
least, the antebellum compromise amendment to perpetually entrench
slavery in the Constitution no longer offered a compromise to safe-
guard national unity. By requiring a contemporary consensus, how-
ever defined quantitatively, moribund amendment proposals could be
permanently put to rest. Further, citizens and political representatives
could rest easier knowing no time bombs lurked to potentially cause
unpleasant surprise. Thus, the inherent time limitations for proposed
106. See JOHN A. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING § 526, at 546-47 (4th rev. ed. 1887); see
also Comment, Ratification of Child Labor Amendment by a State Legislature After Previ-
ous Rejection, 47 YALE L.J. 148, 150 n.13 (1937) (noting that contemporaneous ratification
requirement probably derived from Jameson's treatise).
107. JAMESON, supra note 106, § 585, at 634.
108. Remember that when Jameson issued his treatise, Congress had not yet begun its
practice of including a seven-year time limitation in its proposals of amendments to the
states.
109. In 1861, Congress proposed the following amendment to the states: "No amend-
ment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power
to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." BERNSTEIN & AGEL,
supra note 9, at 302 (statement by Senator Corwin).
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amendments seemed like an elegant solution to the development of
congressional precedent denying state rescission power.110
Little surprise attended the Supreme Court's adoption of Jame-
son's time limitations approach when the Court decided a challenge to
the Eighteenth Amendment. In Dillon v. Gloss,"' the Court decided
a challenge to Congress's limitation of the Eighteenth Amendment's
ratification to a period of seven years." 2 In an attempt to kill two
birds with one stone, the Court ruled that not only did Congress have
the power to limit the ratification period, but also that amendments
must be ratified within a reasonable time even if Congress does not
specify a particular time. That Article V did not express this reason-
able time requirement did not daunt the Court, but instead supported
its conclusion:
That the Constitution contains no express provision on the sub-
ject is not in itself controlling .... We do not find anything in
the Article [V] which suggests that an amendment once pro-
posed, is to be open to ratification for all time, or that ratifica-
tion in some of the states may be separated from that in others
by many years and yet be effective."
Indeed, the Court articulated three reasons for its conclusion. First,
the Dillon Court reasoned that congressional proposal and subse-
quent ratification constitute "succeeding steps in a single en-
deavor.""' 4 This seems to draw a parallel to ordinary Article I-type
federal legislation in which the President has only a short time to ap-
prove or disapprove a bill proposed by Congress. 1 5 Second, the
Court reasoned that because Congress only proposes Article V-type
legislation "when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor," states
110. According to Jameson's argument, expired amendments would not prevent the
proposed constitutional change from being made. Instead, Congress would only have to
repropose the amendment (or similar) version to the states.
111. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
112. The Eighteenth Amendment was the first amendment proposed by Congress with
an express ratification time limitation. With the exception of the Nineteenth Amendment,
that practice has continued for all subsequent amendments, even to the point that the
seven-year period has become entrenched as the chosen length of time. Since the Twenty-
Third Amendment, however, the limitations period has accompanied the proposal, rather
than being included in the text of the amendment itself. Compare U.S. CoNsT. amends.
XVIII, XX-XXII (specifying ratification period in text of amendment), with U.S. CONST.
amends. XXIII-XXVI (specifying ratification period in accompanying proposal). See gen-
erally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of
Time, 57 TEx. L. REv. 919, 920-21 (1979) (discussing ratification deadlines, and noting that
Nineteenth Amendment had no deadline).
113. Dillon, 256 U.S. at 373-74 (1921).
114. Id.
115. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (Presentment Clause).
should "presently" take up the matter and vote upon the proposal.116
Finally, the third reason given by the Court is the most substantial, not
only in the amount of attention that it received in the decision relative
to the short shrift of the first two, but in the persuasive effect it has
had on subsequent commentary. Acknowledging Jameson's treatise,
the Court quoted his statement:
"[T]hat an alteration of the Constitution proposed to-day has
relation to the sentiment and felt needs of to-day, and that, if
not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to
exist, it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be
voted upon, unless a second time proposed by Congress. 1" 7
Reasoning, as did Jameson, that "ratification is but the expression of
the approbation of the people" the Court ruled that the ratification
process must reflect the contemporaneous will of the people." 8
Despite the adoption of the contemporaneousness requirement
for amendment ratifications, the Dillon Court declined to state what
length of time would be insufficiently contemporaneous. The Court
did rule that the seven-year period specified by Congress for the
Eighteenth Amendment passed muster. But the Court failed even to
specify criteria for a calculus to determine the reasonableness of a
time period. Moreover, the Court neglected to state whether all pro-
spective amendments share the same limitations period-whatever
number of years it might prove to be-or whether an amendment's
topic or type of proposed change affect the ratification deadline. 1 9
At most, the Dillon decision seems to suggest a range within which the
ratification limitations period must fall. Seven years clearly satisfies
the contemporaneousness requirement. Sixty years, however, seems
to have been too long for the Dillon Court. When the Court decided
Dillon in 1921, it noted that the continuing viability of the Corwin
Amendment-proposed in 1861, and the most recent of unratified
amendments without a congressionally specified time limitation-con-
stituted an "untenable" proposition. 20 Ultimately, the Dillon Court
did little to establish a ratification limitations period, except to posit
its existence.
116. Dillon, 256 U.S. at 375.
117. Id. (quoting JAMESON, supra note 106, § 585).
118. Id.
119. For example, one might expect that amendments called for by the states to remedy
a seemingly temporary abuse of power by a federal official might require quicker consider-
ation than a sweeping change to the organization of individual rights protections under the
Constitution.
120. See Dillon, 256 U.S. at 375.
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Despite this failure of the Court to delineate a time period or
provide any more authority than Article V implications and a treatise
on constitutional conventions, 121 constitutional commentators ac-
cepted the result and the scholarly consensus embraced the result in
Dillon."2 But then in Coleman, the Court ceded the issue to Con-
gress. By allowing the very institution that proposes the amendment
to determine whether the ratification was valid, the Court essentially
nullified the requirement. "Coleman could be interpreted as an evis-
ceration of any real timeliness requirement, since the branch that ini-
tially proposed an amendment [Congress] would also be able to
decide whether the amendment had been added to the Constitu-
tion."'12 3 In effect the express holding of Dillon and the de facto effect
of Coleman conflict."
In one respect, however, Dillon and Coleman agree: the Court
has been unable to formulate exactly what is the definite time beyond
which a ratification must be invalid. Assuming amendments must be
ratified within a reasonable time implies that there is a time which is
too long. Yet, no one has put a number on this unreasonable time.
The Court punted the issue to Congress, with the result, already
noted, that the ratification timeliness requirement has become even
less certain.
Article V does not provide even the slightest guidance on what a
reasonable time would be. Seven years is the longest time that has
definitely been accepted by Congress and the Court. Yet, the seven
year requirement originated not on the basis of principle but as a com-
promise between "wet" and "dry" states on the issue of prohibition
repeal. 2' Thus, advocates of this position are willing to accept the
imposition of a constraint on the amendment process that has no dis-
121. Jameson's treatise acknowledged that it would only "touch upon the subject of
constitutional provisions for amending Constitutions." JAMESON, supra note 106, § 525, at
546. Indeed, seven of the eight chapters of Jameson's treatise concern State and federal
constitutional conventions.
122. See Note, supra note 49, at 394 n.8 (collecting authority); see also, e.g., HENRY
RoTrsCHAEFER, CASES ON CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW 450 (1939); William A. Platz, Article
Five of the Federal Constitution, 3 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 17, 36 (1934); Note, What Is the
Status of the Child Labor Amendment?, 26 GEo. L.J. 107, 113 (1937).
123. Dalzell & Beste, supra note 78, at 520.
124. See id.
125. The choice of seven years at the limitations period arose as the result of a compro-
mise between "dry" representatives supporting prohibition and "wets" who favored Eight-
eenth Amendment repeal. Thus, there is nothing magical about seven years per se. See
JAMESON, supra note 106, §§ 583-86, at 631-36; see also BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 9,
at 173-74 (noting time limitation's origin in compromise); Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 920-
21.
coverable basis in Article V. Moreover, they are willing to accept
some federal branch-some say the Court, some say the Congress-
negating the act of states ratifying an amendment. As "[a] rescission
of a prior ratification indicates a reassessment of the state's expression
of consent, and by terminating its consent, it suspends the need for a
congressional decision as to the contemporaneousness of the prior
consent."'1 26 Thus, the willingness to accept these results has come
from myopic examinations of this issue alone. The issue of timeliness,
however, directly implicates both the right of states to rescind, and the
question of who should declare an amendment's successful
ratification.
B. The Argument Against Expiration
Article V does not impose deadlines on the ratification process.
Neither does it prevent amendments from being conditioned with a
"statute of limitations" when Congress submits the measure to the
states.27 In the absence of express constitutional instruction on the
issue of whether an amendment expires due to neglect, the intent of
Article V as a remedy for problems inhering in the central govern-
ment and vehicle for improvements controls.
At its root, the issue of whether a pending amendment expires
after a long period of neglect by the states contains the question of
whether authority over the states exists in the ratification process.
The Constitution contains no express provision empowering Congress,
or any other central government branch, to nullify the action of a state
in the ratification process. Instead, the federal nature of the ratifica-
tion process confers rare parity with Congress upon the states. Thus,
the extent of power to nullify states' actions in the ratification process
is the extent to which states' authority is eroded.128 In short, a power
of Congress, or the federal courts, to declare an amendment expired
would be a power of the central government, defeating the purpose of
Article V-to strike a balance between the federal and national na-
ture of the union.
126. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1145-46 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated as moot sub
nom. NOW v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
127. See Grover Rees III, Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal
Rights Amendment Extension, 58 Tx. L. REv. 875, 878 &k n.11 (1980).
128. A similar calculus of the allocation of powers applies to the issue of rescission.
"[I]f Congress could refuse to recognize a state's rescission, it would mean that Congress
would supplant the expression of the people's representative with its own assessment of
consent by holding that the prior expression of consent is still valid." Freeman, 529 F.
Supp. at 1146.
Winter 19971 HOW AMENDMENTS ARE MADE
578 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:545
There can be no doubt about the necessity for sufficient time for
deliberation to allow states to give their informed consent to a pro-
posed amendment. In his commentaries on the Constitution, Justice
Story first noted that the ratification process could require good
number of years:
Time is thus allowed, and ample time, for deliberation, both in
proposing and ratifying amendments. They cannot be carried by
surprise, or intrigue, or artifice. Indeed, years may elapse
before a deliberate judgment may be passed upon them, unless
some pressing emergency calls for instant action. 29
At the time Justice Story wrote, no amendment had required more
than two years to secure ratification by three-quarters of the states. 30
Nonetheless, Justice Story's commentary clearly anticipates that some
amendments will require a longer period according to the nature of
the amendment.
Once Congress submits its proposed constitutional text to the
state, its role in the amendment process ceases.13' As a coequal with
the states in the amending process, Congress has no authority over the
states to prevent them from ratifying a pending amendment regardless
of the number of years between ratifications. The congressional solu-
tion is to impose ratification deadlines along with its proposals. The
state solution to the problem of insufficient time for deliberation is to
call a constitutional amendment convention on the subject. Ulti-
mately, amendments do not expire on their own.
Ironically, the rule that amendments without internal time dead-
lines do not expire may lend more certainty to the ratification process.
When the time after proposal but before ratification stretched
into decades and centuries, it would be unclear to state legisla-
tures whether they could assume that the amendment was a
"dead letter" or whether they should take the time and effort to
rescind their prior ratifications if they no longer support the
amendment. This problem might be countered by the establish-
ment of a presumption that a state's ratification would continue
for all time as long as the state did not attempt to rescind its
ratification. A presumption of this sort would be problematic,
however. Not only does it seem unrealistic to assume that such
a presumption would be understood and recognized by succes-
sive generations of state legislators, but most commentators and
129. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrTUION § 1824, at 688 (1833).
130. The first twelve amendments to the Constitution were ratified in quick order. See
1 DEBATE, supra note 23, at 984-85 (listing dates of proposal and ratification).
131. See generally Dellinger, supra note 10; Rees, supra note 127, at 877-86.
the Supreme Court have refused to recognize a state's right to
rescind its prior ratification of an amendment. 132
Granted, this option gives rise to an unenviable lack of closure to the
process of amending the Constitution. For lack of expiration after
long periods, forgotten battles may resurface unnecessarily or even
dangerously. Slavery has been put to rest, hopefully never to rise
again. That the Corwin Amendment haunts the annals of history is
not desirable. A congressional declaration of expiration, however,
does not inter this issue.
As the Corwin Amendment dramatically illustrates, substan-
tively evil amendments are theoretically possible under any
amendment scheme, including Article V's. Unless all amend-
ment is prohibited, tyrannous amendment is always possible.
And if amendment is prohibited, changed circumstances may re-
quire amendment to avoid tyranny. Why are we willing to trust
government to amend, but not the People?133
It would be best if some definite time period existed during which
amendments remain viable, and not one bit longer. But any definite
time period must be an arbitrary choice, and would thus become an-
other arbitrarily chosen hurdle in an already devilishly difficult pro-
cess. The best we could do would be to amend Article V to impose
such a period. Gloss aside, we should not whitewash the Constitution.
Superficial fixes have an unnerving tendency to become problematic
during difficult times. All of this, of course, is presently relevant to
only four very old, almost forgotten, amendments; but, this is what
Justice Butler said of the current Twenty-Seventh Amendment while it
was still pending earlier this century.134
C. May Congress and the States Impose Ratification Deadlines?
The fact that amendments do not expire on their own does not
also mean that amendments cannot be given an expiration date. His-
torically, there has been little challenge to the assumption that amend-
ment ratification deadlines are valid. Indeed, when the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment passed, a flurry of activity in Congress to check
for other time bombs was limited to a search for amendments without
attached ratification deadlines. Similarly, when Congress considered
an extension of the deadline for ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment, scholars did not question the efficacy of the imposed
132. Dalzell & Beste, supra note 78, at 527.
133. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Arti-
cle V, 55 U. Csn. L. REv. 1043, 1098 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited].
134. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 472 (1939) (Butler, J., dissenting) (quoting
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1921)).
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deadline, but whether Congress could extend such a deadline after the
initial proposal. 35 Were congressionally imposed deadlines mere nul-
lities, then the ERA would still be pending, and only three states short
of constitutional validity.136 If, as the consensus seems to assume,
Congress may impose a ratification deadline, may states also condi-
tion their ratifications with a deadline? As a matter of parity, states
are coequals in the constitutional amending process. Additionally,
one court has reasoned that states implicitly conditioned their ratifica-
tions with the requirement that the amendment pass within the time
limitation imposed by Congress.137 Surprisingly, the widespread ac-
ceptance of congressional power to condition ratification has not
raised this corollary issue of whether states may do the same. Perhaps
equally surprising is the quiet acquiescence with which congressionally
imposed amendment deadlines have been received.
1. Congressional Power to Impose a Deadline on the Ratification
Process
Since the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress has imposed ratifi-
cation limitation periods upon proposing constitutional amendments
to the states. 38 Little controversy has attended this congressional
practice. Interestingly, Madison's argument that a constitutional text
may not be conditionally accepted seems as applicable in the context
of a time condition as it does in the context of rescission of a state's
earlier ratification. 139 Judge Jameson, who first raised this Madisonian
argument in the context of amendments, failed to apply the argument
to time limitations imposed by Congress. Subsequent commentary
also has not quarreled with the practice of congressionally imposed
ratification deadlines.
Article V does not expressly prohibit ratification deadlines. And,
as a matter of policy, it is unproblematic that the institution proposing
135. Compare Ginsburg, supra note 112 (arguing that Congress could extend ratifica-
tion deadline for equal rights amendment), with Rees, supra note 127 (arguing that Con-
gress could not extend deadline once proposed to states).
136. The constitutional proposal that would still be pending-in addition to those with-
out attending deadlines-would be the District of Columbia Statehood Amendment. See
BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 9, at 303.
137. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1153 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated as moot sub
nom. NOW v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
138. The current practice of specifying the deadline outside of the proposed constitu-
tional text itself began as a response to concerns about the Constitution being cluttered
with provisions about time requirements that became mere surplusage upon passage.
139. A ratification deadline is after all clearly a conditional assent: one that is with-
drawn if a condition subsequent is not met. But a rescission is an unconditional withdrawal
of assent.
the law simultaneously constrains the period of pendency. Dangers of
self-dealing by federal officials do not present themselves in this situa-
tion, 140 for an impracticably short ratification deadline would be self-
defeating. A very long ratification period does not provide the federal
government undue advantage over the states. In the instance of an
amendment arising out of a call by two-thirds of the states, however,
the calculus of interest and self-dealing changes significantly.
For example, if a requisite number of states call for a congres-
sional term-limits amendment, Congress could thwart the will of the
states by setting an impossibly quick ratification deadline. For this
reason, Congress's power is expressly confined by Article V to the
calling of a constitutional convention to propose an amendment.14 1
Congress may not impose a deadline in such an instance. Of course,
the composition of such a convention is an unresolved matter, since
one has never been called. If, as some commentators suspect, the
Congress would elect many or all of its own members as delegates to a
constitutional convention, the wisdom of allowing the convention to
specify a deadline poses similar dangers of federal self-dealing for
which Article V is an intended remedy. Thus, a rule that Congress
may impose a deadline for proposals that it originates, but for amend-
ments called for by the states, comports with the remedial nature of
Article V.
2. Prerogative of Ratifying States to Specify Time Limitations
As a collective, coequal branch with Congress in the amending
process, states may also have the same power to condition their as-
sents with a ratification deadline. Although simple parity suggests this
prerogative, the complexity in keeping track of valid ratifications
might prove formidable. Although the permanence of a constitu-
tional amendment suggests the incongruousness of short deadlines,
states should have the same power to ensure contemporaneousness as
Congress. 42 For example during the ratification of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment, Kentucky and Oregon included time limits
in their ratification documents. 143 Although the issue of these time
limits' validity did not require immediate resolution because of the
ERA's failure to pass, future amendments will likely raise the issue.
140. But see Amar, Consent, supra note 12, at 460.
141. See THE FEDERALIST No. 85 at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
142. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1154.
143. See Rees, supra note 127, at 915 & n.201.
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Ultimately, the less convenient option of allowing states to condi-
tion their ratifications with a deadline proves the least problematic in
terms of federal theory. First, Article V provides that each state legis-
lature ratify or reject an amendment according to the internal rules
that the legislature sets.'" Second, to deny states the power to impose
a ratification deadline requires an external authority-de facto, the
federal government-to impermissibly nullify state actions.
III. Who Should Announce the Advent of
Newborn Amendments?
Questions about who should announce a new constitutional
amendment do not arise out of a constitutionally conferred legal
duty,145 but out of the very practical need to provide notice to mem-
bers of our society when our most fundamental rules change. As legal
philosopher H.L.A. Hart noted, every society requires some means to
apprise its members about which rules are legally binding, which are
exhortatory, and which are nullities. 46 Of course, the text of an
amendment itself reads the same during its pendency and after its rati-
fication. Thus, according to Article V, something external to the text
must serve to declare an amendment's validity upon successful ratifi-
cation. 47 As ratification of an amendment may require many genera-
tions, as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment attests, institutional (rather
than human) memory seems necessary to keep track of the process.
The most obvious candidate for keeping a tally of ratifications
may be the ratifiers themselves-the states. Since an amendment be-
comes valid upon ratification by the last state constituting a three-
quarters majority, why should an announcement by that state not suf-
144. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1287, 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
145. Although the occasional need to resolve questionable ratifications and proposals
will present itself, a widely accepted rule of recognition by a particular institution will help
avert crises of constitutional doubt about which provisions remain legitimate.
146. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONcEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). Calling them
"rules of recognition," Hart described the importance of having well-established means for
sorting rules into laws, customs, and etiquette. Id. at 100-10.
147. Remember that in addition to procedural constraints, Article V contains substan-
tive constraints disallowing amendment of the slave-trade constitutional provisions prior to
1808, or amendment-at any time--of the provision that states enjoy equal representation
in the U.S. Senate. Recently, there has been a focus on whether Article V implicitly con-
tains other substantive constraints on such fundamental rights as speech, conscience, and
assembly. See, e.g., Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 131, at 1044-45 n.1; Jeff Ro-
sen, Was the Flag-Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073 (1991).
While interesting and important, this issue lies beyond the scope of this Article. Nonethe-
less, the scholarly consensus agrees that the amending process is substantively delimited,
even if only by the express Article V guarantee of equal representation in the Senate.
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fice? Amendment-capping states could include in their declarations
of validity a listing of the originating Congress and the other ratifying
states. However, historical precedent and Supreme Court authority
suggest that Congress should declare an amendment's validity.1t The
United States Code, by contrast, cedes the record-keeping and certify-
ing function to an executive branch official.149 The Constitution itself
does not textually commit a duty to declare an amendment's validity
to any particular branch or official. Thus, perhaps the President-
with the vast communicative resources attending that office-may be
best suited to announcing a new amendment's validity. Further, presi-
dents have seemingly always wanted a role in the amending pro-
cess. 5 0 Alternatively, the Court itself may prove a good candidate for
resolving amending process questions because it has effectively al-
layed challenges to several amendments' validity. Resort to the courts
remains a certainty, especially with amendments ensuring or confer-
ring individual rights. Of course, the resolution of such suits will nec-
essarily depend upon a determination of whether or not an
amendment has the effect of law. Yet, a striking down of an amend-
ment by unelected officials with lifetime tenure would seem to consti-
tute a profoundly antidemocratic action.
A. The States?
Several advantages would inhere in a practice of looking to the
declaration of the last state constituting a three-quarters ratifying ma-
jority as the accepted form of notice of an amendment's validity.
First, it would alleviate the potential for self-dealing by federal offi-
cials seeking to delay, or to deny, an amendment's validity by giving
tardy notice. Second, this practice would comport with the amending
scheme of Article V, which requires no further action following the
ratifications of three-quarters of the states.'51 Ultimately, any practice
of recognizing an amendment's validity that is divorced from the state
148. See infra Part III.B (discussing Civil Rights Amendments' enactments and Cole-
man v. Miller).
149. See 1 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1984) (instructing Archivist of the United States to keep
track of ratifications and issue certificate when three-quarters of states have ratified).
150. See infra Part III.C (discussing efforts by presidents to assume amending process
roles).
151. See United States ex rel. Widenmann v. Colby, 265 F. 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1920),
affd sub nom. United States ex rel. Widenmann v. Hughes, 257 U.S. 619 (1921) ("It is the
approval of the requisite number of states, not the proclamation, that gives vitality to the
amendment and makes it a part of the supreme law of the land."); see also Dellinger, supra
note 10, at 389-405.
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ratifications adds another hurdle to an already difficult amending
process. 52
As a matter of federalism, Article V was drafted with the intent
of keeping the central government in check by allocating sufficient
power to the states. 53 For this reason, Article V proved to be a major
selling point during the period of ratification of the Constitution itself,
when Anti-Federalist fears of unlimited central government powers
threatened to derail the new government's establishment. 54 Since
adoption of the Constitution, however, concerns about a renegade
central government have abated, focusing instead on the dangers of
conflicts among states. The Civil War and the experience of Recon-
struction have shown the potential for states to condone oppression
and conffict. 155 Conversely, the experience of the '60s-both the
1860s and 1960s-has established the central government as guarantor
of individual liberties. Thus, it would be regressive for the Federal
Constitution to now foster either conflicts among states, or to under-
mine civil rights progress of the constitutional amendments. 56
Creating a duty in the states to keep track of the ratifications in
order to certify an amendment's validity upon a three-quarters con-
currence will engender state factionalism. States will inevitably vie to
become the amendment-capping state as being the state to complete
the amending process would come with more than just the symbolic
honor of endowing an amendment with the force of law, but also with
the prerogative to determine the effect of other state actions in the
process. Competing declarations based on differing constitutional in-
152. Cf. Lutz, supra note 102, at 265 (concluding that United States Constitution is
extremely difficult to amend.)
153. 2 FARRAND, REcoRDS, supra note 17, at 558 (recounting Hamilton's defense of
plan to allow Congress to propose and states to ratify amendments); THE FEDERALIST No.
39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
154. See generally BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 9, at 22 ("Article V proved its worth
by helping to clinch the adoption of the Constitution."); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE
ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3 (1981) ("[T]he Constitution that came out of the deliberations of 1787
and 1788 was not the same Constitution that went in; for it was accepted subject to the
understanding that it would be amended immediately to provide for a bill of rights.").
155. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1136, 1151, 1162-67, 1180 (1991) [hereinafter Amar, Bill of Rights].
156. At the time of the Civil War, the charter looked to the language of freedom which
was not the Constitution, but the Declaration of Independence of 1776. The reason for this
lay in the fact that the Constitution-in Article V itself!-had not only condoned, but
safeguarded the institution of slavery. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1215 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Four-
teenth Amendment]. Since the adoption of the Civil Rights Amendments, however, the
federal government's role in protecting individual liberties has become well established.
terpretations are easily imaginable as are potential anti-declarations
of constitutional validity issued by states denying the legitimacy of pu-
tative amendments. Strength in numbers would become important as
states chose sides on the question of ratification, and no central forum
would be available for states to resolve suspect ratifications or
rejections.
Until now, the attempts to become the amendment-capping state
have been friendly contests among states seeking a common goal-to
give validity to an amendment. Nonetheless, several races to become
the amendment-capping state have already demonstrated the chaos
that can ensue. During the ratification process of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, several states attempted to be the state to give the pro-
posal constitutional validity.
Attempting to gain the distinction of becoming the thirty-eighth
state to ratify, North Dakota ratified one state too soon, and
then, upon realizing its mistake, promptly attempted to with-
draw its consent. Minnesota, aware of North Dakota's ratifica-
tion but not its withdrawal, then ratified, assuming it had put the
amendment over the top. Nevada's ratification followed imme-
diately.... Does this actually make Nevada the thirty-eighth
state?15
7
Although noted in a slightly different context, the statement in The
Federalist aptly describes the dangers of interstate conflicts determin-
ing the outcome of a selection process affecting the federal govern-
ment: "Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial
of actual force may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census
of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election."' 5 8 In
short, a declaration by the last state of a three-quarters ratifying ma-
jority cannot serve to resolve an amendment's validity without intro-
ducing unacceptable dangers into the amending process. After all,
history has shown the chaos and confusion attending states' attempts
to become the one state to give an amendment life. Thus, a single
authority would seem better suited to the task of resolving ratification
questions.
B. Congress?
Both historical and Supreme Court precedents affirm the prerog-
ative of Congress to declare an amendment's validity. Since the First
157. FREEDMAN & NAUGHTON, supra note 2, at 18. Similarly, states vied for the honor
of ratifying the TWenty-Seventh Amendment. See BEmNSTIN & AGEL, supra note 9, at
245.
158. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 277 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Congress dealt with the issue of how to treat state calls for a constitu-
tional convention to propose declaration of rights amendments, Con-
gress has often taken it upon itself to decide whether to give effect to
state actions in the amending process. The First Congress, following
the suggestion of James Madison, tabled the received calls from states
for constitutional conventions until the requisite number was received.
The issue was then expected to be taken up and decided by Con-
gress.159 During key moments in our national history, Congress has
acted to allay doubts about the validity of amendments with question-
able pedigrees.
The Fourteenth Amendment, with its proposal and ratification ir-
regularities, perhaps benefited most from a congressional declaration
of validity. 60 This Amendment's validity initially was subject to ques-
tion because some state ratifications necessary for the Amendment's
validity had subsequently been rescinded. 6' Congress ultimately re-
sponded by denying the power of states to rescind after ratifying while
affirming the effectiveness of ratification following initial rejection.
Thus the congressional declaration effectively secured the validity of
the Amendment. Similarly, congressional declarations of validity alle-
viated doubts about the passage of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 62
The important role played by Congress in securing the Civil
Rights Amendments was not lost on the Justices of the Supreme
Court who decided the Court's most recent decision on a challenge to
a proposed amendment's legitimacy. Coleman v. Miller involved a
challenge to the viability of the Child Labor Amendment on grounds
that it had expired due to desuetude in state ratifications. 63 In re-
sponse, the Court announced the plenary power of Congress to deter-
mine the validity of amendments:
159. See BERNSMEN & AGEL, supra note 9, at 38.
160. Cf David Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72 IOWA L. Rv.
753, 829-30 nn.253 & 255 (1987) (discussing problematic nature of exclusion of Southern
representatives to Thirty-Ninth Congress and requirement that states ratify Fourteenth
Amendment as precondition of readmission to union). See generally Ferdinand F. Fernan-
dez, The Constitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 378, 380-82,
.392-96, 401-02 (1966).
161. Before the requisite 28th state ratified, Ohio and New Jersey attempted to with-
draw their earlier ratifications. Despite the attempted withdrawal of consent, Congress
passed a resolution declaring three-fourths of the states to have ratified, including Ohio
and New Jersey. See DUMBAULD, supra note 30, at 436 n.17.
162. See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 9, at 103, 115 (noting intense congressional
efforts to secure adoption of the Amendments).
163. 307 U.S. 433, 435, 451 (1939).
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If it be deemed that such a question is an open one when the[ratification time] limit has not been fixed in advance, we think
that it should also be regarded as an open one for consideration
of the Congress when, in the presence of certified ratifications
by three-fourths of the States, the time arrives for the promulga-
tion of the adoption of the amendment. 164
Further, the Court stated that the congressional determination of the
amendment's validity would not be subject to judicial review.165
Similarly, constitutional commentators have urged deference to
congressional declarations about the validity of amendments in light
of historical and case law precedents. 66 Much has been made of the
benefit conferred by the congressional precedent of denying states the
power to rescind. Thus, these commentators urge that congressional
declarations on putative constitutional amendments continue to deter-
mine the validity of amendments' 67
Congressional precedent, however, is oxymoronic. The very na-
ture of the legislative process disallows one session of Congress from
binding future sessions. No matter how entrenched or well-estab-
lished a congressional practice, it may be changed upon concurrence
of a simple majority of the members of Congress. 68 Thus, changing
Congress's past practice of disallowing state rescissions-followed for
a number of amendments-requires fewer votes than needed to pro-
pose a single amendment. In short, congressional precedent proves
descriptive of past actions instead of prescriptive for future congres-
sional actions and declarations. Thus it would be possible for amend-
ments declared ratified by Congress to be declared invalid by the next
session of Congress. 169 Consequently, one can imagine a scenario in
164. Id. at 454.
165. See id.
166. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & NAUGHTON, supra note 2, at 15-19 ("Congressional Prece-
dent"); Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 944 ("I also think, in light of the relevant historical,
'political, social and economic' considerations, that the Court would accord utmost defer-
ence to the first line decisions of Congress in this area."); Kanowitz & Klinger, supra note
54, at 1001 (urging deference to past decisions of Congress and the secretary of state on
rescission issue).
167. See FREEDMAN & NAUGHTON, supra note 2, at 19 ("While Congress need not
exhibit rigid consistency, it has nonetheless attempted over the years to assure the nation
of some stability and rational predictability in its decision-making process-if only to main-
tain its credibility. Congressional history, then, can be taken as a reasonably reliable guide
to future action on the legality of rescission .... "); Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 944.
168. CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF TH-E HoUsE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES OF THE UNrrED STATES ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS § 351, at 164-65
(U.S. Gov. Printing Office 1993).
169. If the vote in favor of recognition was close-with one or two members of each
house casting the deciding vote-this scenario may not be totally improbable.
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which the recognition or rejection of a highly controversial amend-
ment could become a campaign issue so that the next congressional
elections would determine the fate of an amendment. As a result,
election-year rhetoric, more than the text of the Constitution, would
govern the outcome of the amending process. 170
Despite the Coleman Court's statements, Congress cannot have
plenary authority over the ratification process.17' At the very least,
such congressional power would negate obstacles to federal self-deal-
ing that the Framers intended to prevent. Consider a call by states for
an amendment that proves unpopular among members of Congress-
congressional term limits, for example. To allow Congress to stymie
170. Promises of support and opposition to potential constitutional amendments al-
ready play a large role in federal election politics. "[R]epublicans have an ever expanding
laundry list of interests to which they pander. A favorite approach is a constitutional
amendment. This year's Republican platform calls for seven constitutional amendments-
on abortion, a balanced budget, victims' rights, school prayer, flag-burning, term limits and
citizenship for children of illegal immigrants." Albert R. Hunt, The GOP's Problems Run
Deeper Than Bob Dole, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1996, at All.
Since 1989, the number of senators voting in favor of a Flag-Burning Amendment has
been steadily rising, with the last vote falling only three short of meeting the constitutional
requirement of two-thirds of both houses of Congress. See Robin Toner, Flag-Burning
Amendment Fails in Senate, but Margin Narrows: Proposed Constitutional Change Is 3
Votes Short, N.Y. T mEs, Dec. 13, 1995, at Al, A14. Similarly, the Balanced-Budget
Amendment fell only four votes short in the Senate of the constitutional requirement. See
Richard Powelson, Mathews: White House Not Behind My Budget Vote, KNOXviLLE NEws-
SErINEL, Mar. 4, 1994, at A15. The ephemeral nature of amendment politics showed in
the latest vote on the Balanced-Budget Amendment when all five of the senators who
switched from an earlier "no" to "yes" votes faced reelection the next year. See Mark Z.
Barabak, Balanced-Budget About-Face Leaves Feinstein Credibility Insecure, SAN DIEGO
UNION-ThiB., Mar. 4, 1995, at A3. Note, however, that "[o]f the six senators who switched
from 'yes' to 'no', thus sealing the amendment's defeat, none face re-election sooner than
1998, by which time [the March 1995] vote may well be politically irrelevant." Id. Even if
voters remember, a vote either way can be justified because "voter support for a balanced
budget-80 percent in the abstract-plummets to the 30 percent range when Social Secur-
ity is threatened." Id.
Note that concerted efforts are also being made to revise the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of citizenship to those born in the United States and the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause. See Neil A. Lewis, Bill Seeks to End Automatic Citizenship
for All Born in the U.S., N.Y. Timrs, Dec. 14, 1995, at A26 (noting substantial initial sup-
port of congressional representatives for eliminating automatic citizenship for those born
within the United States); J. Michael Parker, Conservative Christians Back 2 Amendment
Ideas, SAN AroNIo ExPnnss-NEws, Dec. 2, 1995, at Al (noting congressional and grass-
roots support for "Religious Equality Amendment" and "Religious Liberties Amend-
ment"). Whatever the wisdom of these proposals, it must be acknowledged that they tar-
get cornerstone constitutional provisions that at least merit greatest deliberation and care
in being amended.
171. Indeed, in the Constitution there exists no textual commitment of amending pro-
cess authority to Congress other than to propose an amendment on its own, or to call a
constitutional convention for purposes of proposing an amendment.
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efforts to amend the Constitution would be to allow the central gov-
ernment more control over the amending process than the Framers
intended.172 Conversely, Congress could, and would be more likely
to, nudge along amendments of which it is especially desirous. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides an example of a Congress deter-
mined to ensure the validity of a particular amendment. This also
runs contrary to the Framers' intent for the amending process, which
was not to be as facile as the passage of ordinary Article I
legislation. 73
If giving Congress plenary power is the solution to current
amending process quandaries, then the cure may well prove worse
than the disease. Instead of having Article V as a rule of recognition
for validly adopted amendments, Congress would have continual
power to requestion the adoption of an amendment. Moreover, it
would politicize the amending process in a way that would not en-
courage greater deliberation, but would subject constitutional propos-
als to the greater vicissitudes of congressional elections.
C. The President and Executive Branch Officials?
Presidents have seemingly always craved a role in the amending
process, despite the fact that the Constitution does not involve the
executive branch in the amending process. President Adams at-
tempted to secure a role for the executive branch in the amending
process by assuming the task of certifying amendments upon sufficient
ratification. 74 Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Hollings-
worth v. Virginia,75 which held that the President does not serve any
function in the amending process, President Buchanan signed the pro-
posed Corwin Amendment in hopes of lending the weight of execu-
tive authority to a compromise that was intended to avoid the Civil
War.' 76 Thereafter, President Lincoln signed what has become the
172. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 17, at 558; THm FEDERALIST No. 85 at 525
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
173. Indeed, Madison noted that it would be inappropriate to approach the process of
constitutional change in the same way as passing ordinary legislation. "[I]t is not to be
inferred from this principle [of popular sovereignty] that the representatives of the people,
whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents
incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution would, on that account, be
justified in a violation of those provisions .... ." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton).
174. See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THm ELEV-
ENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 20-21 (1987).
175. 3 U.S. 378 (1798).
176. See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 9, at 91.
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Thirteenth Amendment in hopes of redeeming the authority of the
executive branch after President Buchanan's support of a slavery-en-
trenching amendment.1 77 President Andrew Johnson proclaimed the
Fourteenth Amendment's validity, after having complained that Con-
gress had not submitted it for his signature prior to its proposal to the
states. 78 Finally, President Carter signed the resolution passed by
Congress to extend the ratification time period for the Equal Rights
Amendment. 79
While the Presidents themselves have not garnered a recognized
role in the amending process, executive branch officials have played
critical roles in the keeping track of pending amendments and issuing
certificates upon ratification completion. In important instances, such
as with the Fourteenth and Twenty-Seventh Amendments, executive
branch officials were the ones who initiated a process culminating in
the recognition of these Amendments. 180 The importance of the exec-
utive branch in the amending process will continue because current
law provides that the Archivist of the United States-who directs an
"independent agency within the executive branch"'13a-keep track of
ratifications and issue a certificate upon successful ratification.'8
Arguably, the Archivist's decision to certify the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment as valid, despite its two-century-long gestation, tipped
the scales in favor to the Amendment's recognition. At the time of
177. Id. at 100.
178. FREEDmAN & NAuGHTON, supra note 2, at 60-61. President Johnson sent the fol-
lowing message to Congress: "Even in ordinary times any question of amending the Con-
stitution must be justly regarded as of permanent importance. This importance is at the
present time enhanced by the fact that the joint resolution was not submitted by the two
Houses for the approval of the President." 2 WATSON, supra note 58, at 1320 (statement
of President Johnson).
179. See Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 930. Interestingly, one scholar argued that Presi-
dent Carter's action was necessary to grant an extension in light of Article I, Section 7,
Clause 3. Charles L. Black, Jr., On Article I, Section 7, Clause 2---and the Amendment of
the Constitution, 87 YALE L.J. 896, 899 (1978).
180. See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 9, at 246; Bernstein, supra note 4, at 540.
181. 44 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988) ("There shall be an independent establishment in the exec-
utive branch of the Government to be known as the National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration. The Administration shall be administered under the supervision and
direction of the Archivist."). The Archivist of the United States is appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 2103(a) (1988). The President retains
the power to remove the Archivist, but must "communicate the reasons for any such re-
moval to each House of the Congress." Id.
182. See 1 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1988) (instructing Archivist of United States to publish new
amendments "with his certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been
adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the
Constitution of the United States").
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the Archivist's certification, congressional elections loomed. 83 As a
matter of campaign strategy, many members did not want to vote
against the popular anti-salary-grab effect of the Amendment-even
on a procedural issue such as the length of the ratification. Therefore,
although Congress held hearings on the legitimacy of the Amend-
ment's long ratification process, the Archivist's certification proved
fait accompli. This experience requires anticipation of other future
amendments whose validity will hinge more on the decision of the
Archivist of whether to issue a certificate than on a congressional vote
taken on a highly popular, controversial, or seemly unquestionable
matter. Would there have been a decision on the legitimacy of the
amending process to receive unbiased scrutiny of the procedural steps
for compliance with Article V dictates if the Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment had instead dealt with flag-burning? a balanced budget require-
ment? or victims' rights?
Executive branch officials-whether the President, Secretary of
State, or Archivist-are not well suited, due to the nature of their
offices, to resolve amending process questions. The very nature of the
powers of the executive branch is to faithfully execute the laws, rather
than to pass judgment upon the validity of a constitutional
amendment.
D. The Judiciary?
The Supreme Court has a history of passing judgment on the va-
lidity of constitutional amendments and the actions of states, Con-
gress, the President, and lower courts in the amending process.184
Although none of the Court's decisions have struck down or denied
the validity of an amendment, the possibility of such an action by the
Court appears profoundly antidemocratic in nature. Judicial review of
the amendment process assumes the power of five unelected Justices
to deny the actions of three-quarters of the states and two-thirds of
183. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 542 ("Whatever the merit of these [amending pro-
cess] issues, political realities dictated the speedy endorsement of the Tventy-seventh
Amendment. On May 20, 1992, Congress confirmed the Archivist's decision by over-
whelming margins in both houses.").
184. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (affirming constitutional-
ity of subject matter of amendment); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (same);
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920) (reviewing state's submission of ratification of
proposed amendment to the people of the state of Ohio); National Prohibition Cases, 253
U.S. at 386 (reviewing question of necessary quorum for Congress to propose amendment
to states); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (reviewing whether presi-
dential signature required to propose amendments to states); United States ex rel.
Widenmann v. Hughes, 257 U.S. 619 (1921) (affirming federal court of appeals decision).
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the members of Congress. 8 ' Further, judicial review of amendments
seems to deny the power of broad-based democratic action to over-
turn earlier decisions of the Court.186 In Goldwater v. Carter,'87 Jus-
tice Powell noted the problematic nature of passing judgment on an
amendment intended to overrule an earlier Court decision:
The proposed [Child Labor] constitutional amendment at issue
in Coleman would have overruled decisions of this Court. Thus,judicial review of the legitimacy of a State's ratification would
have compelled this Court to oversee the very constitutional
process used to reverse Supreme Court decisions. In such cir-
cumstances it may be entirely appropriate for the Judicial
Branch of Government to step aside. 1a8 -
Thus, at the root of concern about judicial review of the amendment
process lies a commitment to maintaining democratic avenues of
change affirmed in Article V. Because constitutional amendments
should be available to overturn the decisions of the Court, the ability
of the judiciary to obstruct the successful ratification of an amend-
ment should not be within the power of the Court.'89
Aside from serious questions about the antidemocratic character-
istics of judicial review, the Court appears to be a good candidate for
pronouncing that status of a questionable amendment. The judicial
forum fosters deliberation of points for and against, offers the resolu-
tion of a single authority rather than many competing coequals in the
amending process, 90 and alleviates the problem of delay in considera-
tion of the amendment by federal officials. While other coordinate
branches may delay addressing questions of constitutional validity, the
judiciary provides a forum to petition for redress immediately upon
the denial of rights or protection conferred (or, less likely, denied) by
a new amendment. 191
185. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962).
References to the "Court" include first and foremost the Supreme Court, but also the
lower courts in their capacity as initiators of the process of judicial review. See, e.g., United
States ex reL Widenmann v. Colby, 265 F. 998 (1920), aff d, 257 U.S. 619 (1921).
186. Cf. Thomas E. Baker, Exercising the Amendment Power to Disapprove of Supreme
Court Decisions: A Proposal for a "Republican Veto," 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 325, 330-
31 (1995) ("By invoking the Article V power, 'wE THE PEOPLE' may exercise a 'republican
veto' to check the High Court's hermeneutical tendency toward judicial oligarchy.")
187. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
188. Id. at 1001 n.2.
189. Subject to the caveat on denial of equal Senate representation as discussed below.
See infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
190. Whether among states qua states, or between Congress and the states-each act-
ing in a federal capacity in the constitutional amending process.
191. See generally Daniel L. Rotenberg, Private Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs-
A Matter of Perspective, Priority, and Process, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 77 (1986).
The problematic nature of judicial review also lies not in the
Court usurping a role in the amending process which it does not have,
but in the implications that such review would have on the balance of
governmental powers and federalism. As noted by Professor Orfield,
the Court does have the power to review the amending process for
compliance with the instructions in Article V:
The theory of the courts in claiming the power to adjudicate
amendments is doubtless the same as that back of the power to
declare laws unconstitutional. The Supreme Court may set
aside any unconstitutional act of Congress or of the President,
and reverse its own and the decisions of the lower courts where
the interpretation was erroneous. From this it follows that
where there is a failure to comply with the regular mode of
amendment prescribed in Article Five, the courts may regard
the procedure as null and void."9
Thus, the past half-century of Court silence on the amending process
arises out of prudential abstention rather than a textual commitment
by the Constitution of the duty to resolve the amending controversies
to another coordinate branch.193
If the Court chooses again to consider challenges to amendments,
it would represent a departure from its decision in Coleman. Yet, the
much-maligned Coleman case-which merely counsels abstention-is
192. See OFMELD, supra note 66, at 13-14. Further, Hamilton contemplated judicial
review of actions taken in the amending process for compliance with the extant
Constitution:
Until the people have by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed
the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individ-
ually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant
their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to
see that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do
their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of
it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.
THE FEDERAL ST No. 78 at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). Even
the Coleman decision recognizes, while declining to exercise, the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion over challenges to constitutional amendments. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 442-
43 (1939).
193. And indeed Coleman itself suggests that the Court's grounds for not reaching the
merits were prudential. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438-41 (affirming Court's jurisdiction
over constitutional challenges).
Even commentators who have urged deference to congressional pronouncements of
constitutional validity acknowledge the potential for the Court to reenter the process of
passing judgment on the amending process. The Court's decisions in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), show the more recent,
more likely, thoughts on prudential abstention due to the presence of a political question.
The Court's current view of judicial review thus appears more robust than that in Coleman.
But cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-03 (1979) (mem.) (citing Coleman with
approval).
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not nearly as pernicious a precedent as the Court's earlier decisions in
challenges to amendments in which the Court heard and decided chal-
lenges to the subject matter of amendments. 194 Although the Court
affirmed each amendment's legitimacy, the very hearing and decision
on the substantive challenges assumes that the Court could decide
that a particular amendment does not encompass subjects that are
amendable. Article V, however, clearly delineates its extant substan-
tive constraint-equal representation in the Senate may not be denied
to a state without its consent. Therefore, the Constitution does not
admit review of an amendment on substantive grounds, except in in-
stances affecting Senate representation.195 Instead, the Court should
limit its review to the constitutionality of amending process actions by
Congress and the states. 96 Accordingly, a few clear pronouncements
would go a long way to restoring certainty to the amending process.197
Most importantly, the limitation of judicial review to procedural
aspects of the amending process would ensure that Article V's ave-
nues of constitutional change would not be blocked.198 Consider, for
example, a successful challenge to an amendment's ratification on
grounds that the lieutenant governor of a ratifying state cast the tie-
breaking vote in its legislature. 99 There would exist a method of cur-
ing the defective ratification by complying with the clarified instruc-
tions of Article V. Even were the Court to hold that an amendment
lapsed due to desuetude in ratifications, the substance of the amend-
ment itself would not be barred from becoming part of the Constitu-
194. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1919) (affirming constitutional-
ity of subject matter of Eighteenth Amendment); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136
(1922) (same).
195. A proposal seemingly as unlikely lo happen as it would be easy to identify.
196. This limitation of judicial review to "legislative invasions" representing a "depar-
ture" from the amending process dictates of the Constitution comports with the expecta-
tions of The Federalist. See supra note 192 (presenting Hamilton's anticipation of judicial
review of amending process actions taken by legislatures).
197. See Dellinger, supra note 10, at 386-87.
198. Judicial review can have a profoundly democratic nature when it compels govern-
mental compliance with valid constitutional amendments. Cf. BRuCE A. ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEoPLE: FouNDAnONS 10 (1991) ("Rather than threatening democracy by frustrating
the statutory demands of the political elite in Washington, the courts serve democracy by
protecting the hard-won principles of a mobilized citizenry against the erosion of political
elites who have failed to gain broad and deep support for their innovations."). In short,
the Court has power to protect the amending process against legislative departures from
valid constitutional provisions.
199. Cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435-36 (involving challenge to validity of rati-
fication of the Child Labor Amendment on grounds that lieutenant governor cast deciding
vote in favor of ratification despite being state executive official, when Article V instructs
state legislatures to act).
tion. 0 With review of procedural challenges to amendments, the
instructions of the Constitution would be clarified and defects in the
process would remain curable likely with action taken by fewer than a
handful of states.
The amending process would benefit from continued reduction of
the friction that currently arises out of uncertainty about which state
actions count in the ratification tally as well as other procedural ques-
tions. Just as Hollingsworth v. Virginia °1 smoothed a process that was
taking on the additional step of presidential approval, so too would
future decisions of the Court have the power to guide the amending
process. Thus, the Court should apply its prudential abstention to
substantive challenges to amendments, but reassume its role as inter-
preter of the Constitution for purposes of the amending process.
Conclusion
Much of the structure and the allocation of powers to the govern-
mental system established by the Constitution can be understood
through the interplay between three fundamental principles of Ameri-
can political thought: federalism, separation of powers, and popular
sovereignty. Although government in the United States implicitly,
and the Constitution itself expressly, begin with the sovereignty of the
people themselves, this principle has been ignored in analyses of the
amending process. The consensus of the people themselves is the
most important factor in determining whether an amendment should
be valid for intents and purposes as part of the Constitution. There
can be no question but that the states which assay the sentiment of
their citizens should be able to modify their actions on a pending
amendment as the people modify their opinions of that amendment.
To deny such a power is to deny that our government truly derives
from the consent of the governed.
The power of a state to reverse an earlier action on a pending
amendment is important to avoid denying citizens the ongoing right to
participate in the constitutional amending process just because they
200. Even this worst case scenario for procedural challenges to a constitutional amend-
ment, would allow Congress to repropose and states to ratify the same amendment. Fur-
ther, future actions on amendment could be timed to comply with the limitations time
period that would be established. Conversely, recent state actions might not need to be
retaken if the Court's rationale were one requiring contemporaneousness.
201. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
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live in states that already ratified.20 2 Because no federal branch can
legitimately declare that states have taken too long to ratify, allowing
rescission and ratification after rejection ensures that this is not just a
government of "We the People of the Not-Yet-Acting States." That
the Framers did not anticipate rescissions is both unsurprising and un-
important to this conclusion. Remember that until the twentieth cen-
tury, no amendment had taken more than four years to be ratified.0 3
The Framers may have anticipated the contemporaneous action of the
roughly dozen states comprising the union, during which time the pop-
ular sentiment on a particular subject was unlikely to reverse itself.
Although the Framers did not speak to the issue of rescission, they
reiterated their commitments to the preservation of inextricable links
between governmental determinations and the people.
The Framers also did not speak to whether pending amendments
expire or may be canceled by Congress. The Constitution contains no
commitment of authority to cancel a pending amendment. However,
the separation of powers principle inhering in the Constitution denies
that Congress as a coequal to states (in their federal ratifying role)
may abridge their power to ratify. Typical notions of federalism do
not apply to the unusual governmental hierarchy for purposes of rati-
fication. So viewed, it becomes obvious that Congress has no more
power to constrain states to cancel an ability to act than to constrain
textual constitutional commitment of decisional power to the Presi-
dent or Supreme Court. To allow Congress to declare as ratified an
amendment that it originated ignores Article V constraints precluding
self-dealing by federal officials. Further, this sort of congressional
power over the amendment process, as affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Coleman v. Miller, would also give Congress too much power
to stymie amendments that might be unpopular with federal officials
yet deemed necessary by the people-term limits, for example.2 4 In
short, respect for coordinate branches of federal government prevents
Congress from simply including rescinding states among ratifying
states in promulgating an amendment.
Similarly, separation of powers denies Congress-or any other
federal branch for that matter-from declaring an amendment lapsed
202. For example, the residents of several New England states since 1780 would have
been denied their right to disapprove the reapportionment amendment proposed as part of
the Bill of Rights.
203. See Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 920-21.
204. Perhaps it is not coincidental that the executive branch, which has no formal role
in the amending process has a termlimits amendment, while the legislative branch does
not.
because states have taken too long to ratify or conclusively reject an
amendment. This can be seen most clearly in an instance in which
states would call for an amendment by the requisite two-thirds; Con-
gress should not have the power to set such a short ratification dead-
line that it prevents states from getting the desired amendment.
Similarly, Congress's power to impose ratification deadlines on its
own proposals does not allow states to be taken hostage in other
ways-by conditioning release of federal highway funds on a ratifica-
tion of an amendment, for example. Those amendments proposed by
Congress without time limits do not expire for lack of a power of any
federal branch to kill them.
Finally, the principle of separation of powers prevents congress
from being the final arbiter of whether or not an amendment has val-
idly been passed. No federal branch should have the power to goal-
tend the amendment process. Accordingly, though perhaps counter-
intuitive to suggest that the Supreme Court should have the power to
hear suits challenging the validity of amendments, this proposal is lim-
ited to procedural challenges-the substance of amendments being
largely unconstrained by Article V. Moreover, the Supreme Court
may only umpire the rules of the game. In doing so, the eradication of
present confusion will make a difficult and disputed amendment pro-
cess safe and easy as the Framers intended. Procedural defects could
be cured according to definite rules. Our amendment process could
use some curing, for it ails from unnecessary confusion and evident
departure from the will of the people.
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